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A SHORT COURSE ON WATER LAW
FOR THE EASTERN UNITED STATES
EARL FINBAR MURPHYt
INTRODUCTION
Until the past generation, problems in water law have been re-
garded as exclusively the concern of jurisdictions possessing either
arid or saturated lands. The increasing industrialization and urban
concentration occurring since 1900 have radically altered this attitude.
Nowhere is this more strikingly shown than in the United States. In
this country water use rose from 40 billion gallons per day in 1900 to
92 billion in 1930, and 312 billion in 1960. For the entire period, the
total readily available fresh water supply has been 515 billion gallons
per day. By 1975 it is predicted the United States will be drawing 453
billion of this each day and, in order to safeguard such demands, will
require a quantity of water one third more than the total supply. This
physical miracle is to be performed through techniques for the conver-
sion of saline and brackish waters, which pose engineering and eco-
nomic difficulties requiring Herculean solutions. Because these changes
are to occur in the eastern United States, which presently has 55 per
cent of the nation's population and 65 per cent of its industry; and
because this is the area previously regarded as unaffected by water
problems, an examination of the pertinent law is in order in this
interval between the realization of impending doom and the coming
of the anticipated technical salvation.,
The law in this part of the country is substantially that of the
English common law, subject to legislation for administrative re-
source control enacted at an accelerating rate since the American
Civil War. There is, for the novice, in the eastern sector of the United
States a surprising quantity of fully worked-out dogma for water
t Associate Professor of Law, Temple University, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
1. Smith, Water Desalting Is Being Studied, N.Y. Times, Oct. 23, 1960, § 3,
p. 1, col. 4.
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which has existed for some time.2 The settlers of the New World,
upon finding conditions along the Atlantic seaboard similar to their
native England's, applied existing doctrines on the subject of water
control. Whether those doctrines were modified depended upon two
factors which did not always accompany each other: the similarity of
the problems met and the elasticity of the minds of the decision-
makers called upon to solve them. From the definition of a natural
watercourse through all the other phases of the topic, the American
law makers until the present century have sought a conformity be-
tween the common law of England and the common necessity of the
American day that has been lacking quite often until the opinions
were handed down or the statutes enacted. Like judges, legislators
have been compelled to balance between a belief in present need and
the concepts of an inherited past, with the result that the best of
intentions have often resulted in the most disparate results. The
consequence for contemporary water resource law is a tension between
ancient rules, accepted practice, and future policy, as well as a never-
ending conflict as to what precisely constitutes each of these concepts.
Such a complex of issues can best be studied in an examination of
areas of special controversy in water use, so that some understanding
of the real and the legal choices can be had.3
I. THE WATERCOURSE
Even the definition of a watercourse is rendered uncertain by this
difference. On one side are the forces of precision in the law who say
a natural watercourse is a stream containing water "flowing in a
defined channel, with a bed and sides . . .usually discharging itself
into some other stream or body of water. .. .,4 Within it, the flow of
water, though not necessarily incessant,5 must flow from some sub-
stantial and well-defined source6 in some specific direction.7 These are
2. 7 Holdsworth, History of English Law 338 (1926).
3. See Conservation Foundation, The Law of Water Allocation in the Eastern
United States (1958), collecting the papers of an October, 1956 symposium of
The Conservation Foundation. The definition of eastern United States is that
employed by Fischer, Western Experience and Eastern Appropriation Proposals
which says all land lying east of the first tier of states west of the Mississippi
is eastern America. Id. at 75.
4. Luther v. Winnisimmet Co., 63 Mass. (9 Cush.) 171, 174 (1851); Angell,
Watercourses § 4 (7th ed. 1877).
5. Reynolds v. McArthur, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 417 (1829); Jackman v. Arlington
Mills, 137 Mass. 277 (1884); Shields v. Arndt, 3 N.J. Eq. 234 (Ch. 1842); Wagner
v. Long Island R.R., 2 Hun 633, 5 Thomp. & C. 163 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1874).
6. Fitzgerald v. Fortier, 292 Mass. 268, 198 N.E. 167 (1935); Wheatley v.
Baugh, 25 Pa. 528 (1855); Dudden v. Guardians of the Poor of the Clutton
Union, 1 H.&N. 627, 156 Eng. Rep. 1353 (1857).
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the tests adopted to easily distinguish a watercourse from vagrant
water, accumulating after a rain, or following upon the melting of
snow, and flowing across the surface or natural declivities of the
ground.8
Unfortunately for the sake of legal clarity, however, there exists
a body of cases contradictory to these simple rules. Obvious run-off
water has been held to be a watercourse where its long continued,
if intermittent, existence has worn a well-defined course into the
ground so that a channel and banks have been created., A flow of
water with a continuous current, but lacking either bed or banks, has
been held to be a natural watercourse. 10 A flow of surface water,
appearing only during rainy seasons, running partly over the ground,
partly in a channel with bed and banks, and partly through culverts,
has been held to be a watercourse.1 And, a course of water, running
but a part of the year, and flowing unconfined over the ground level
part of its way, has also been held to be a natural watercourse. 1 Even
admitting that the defining of a watercourse is a question normally to
be settled by a jury, how did these cases meet the test laid down so
decisively by the first group of cases?
The answer, of course, lies in the fact that a preordained, rigid rule
of law is no more enforcible in this area than in any other part of the
Anglo-American legal system. For reasons of justice, the courts in
these "exceptional" cases were prepared to find the tests sufficiently
met; and the reasons of justice most generally consist of what the
court would consider excessive economic hardship in the particular
situation. Because of this, when trying to define a legal orbit for the
term "natural watercourse," perhaps all that can be said is this: If
it comes from a permanent source, or if surface water comes fairly
regularly, so that a stream flows over the land, either on a level or
in a depression with bed and banks, and it all flows into some other
7. New Jersey, Ind. & Ill. R.R. v. Tutt, 168 Ind. 205, 80 N.E. 420 (1907);
Town of Holliston v. Holliston Water Co., 306 Mass. 17, 27 N.E.2d 194 (1940);
State ex rel. Olcott v. Hawk, 105 Ore. 319, 208 Pac. 709 (1922).
8. Stanchfield v. City of Newton, 142 Mass. 110, 7 N.E. 703 (1886); Ashley v.
Wolcott, 65 Mass. (11 Cush.) 192 (1853); Kunkle v. Borough of Ford City, 305
Pa. 416, 158 Atl. 159 (1932).
9. Sawyer v. Shader, 321 Mass. 725, 75 N.E.2d 647 (1947). See also Rhoads v.
Davidheiser, 133 Pa. 226, 19 Atl. 400 (1890).
10. Macomber v. Godfrey, 108 Mass. 219 (1871).
11. The court refused to upset a master's finding to that effect in Fitzgerald
v. Fortier, 292 Mass. 268, 198 N.E. 167 (1935); Kislinski v. Gilboy, 19 Pa.
Super. 453 (1902) (what constitutes a water course being a jury question is a
factor that may produce important precedental differences).
12. Yaskill v. Thibault, 273 Mass. 266, 173 N.E. 504 (1930). See also In the
Matter of Johnson Creek, 159 Wash. 629, 294 Pac. 566 (1930).
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body of water, then the probability is that it will be held to be a
natural watercourse; whereas if it goes no great distance, or is as-
sisted by human contrivance for its initial existence, or is absorbed
into the ground over which it runs, then the chances are that no court
would hold it a natural watercourse. 13
II. THE USING OF THE WATERCOURSE
Assuming, however, that all parties agree that the body of water
involved is a natural watercourse, what rights in it have persons
desiring its use? A basic presumption in the common law of water
as it developed after the 17th century was that the only persons with
any interest in a flowing stream were owners of land along its banks
and that the only problem in law was the manner in which they would
divide its use. Anciently it was held that riparian owners were en-
titled to receive the waters of the stream in their natural state. How-
ever, with the rise of the market economy and the coming of
industrialization, this rule was generally modified so that a riparian
owner now has at best the right to receive the stream's waters in
their natural state subject to the reasonable use of the water by other
riparian owners and himself.' 4 Therefore, no riparian owner is
entitled to a stream in its natural condition, unaffected by the presence
of man, since every riparian owner may reasonably use the water as
it flows by his land, so. long as he does not destroy it by diversion or
throw it back by obstruction.',
Reasonable use includes the right to divert a stream so long as it
is not totally absorbed during the diversion. Some must be left sub-
sequently for the other riparian owners so that each may have a
roughly equal use of the water, no matter how generally beneficial
13. Thompson v. New Haven Water Co., 86 Conn. 597, 86 Ati. 585 (1913);
Peck v. Clark, 142 Mass. 436, 8 N.E. 335 (1886); Aetna Mills v. Inhabitants of
Brookline, 127 Mass. 69 (1879); Macomber v. Godfrey, 108 Mass. 219 (1871).
For a modern definition that throws together vagrant surface waters and water-
courses, see Langbein & Wells, The Water in Rivers and Creeks, Water: The
Yearbook of Agriculture 52 (1955). For examples of ambiguous statutory
definitions, pointing up the importance of judicial definitions, compare La. Rev.
Stat. § 56:1433 (1952) and Mich. Stat. Ann. § 3.531 (1952) with Mass. Ann.
Laws c. 21, § 1 (Supp. 1959).
14. Lauer, The Riparian Right in Property, in Water Resources and the Law
133 (1958). For the conflict in the 17th century, compare 1 Coke, First Institute
of the Laws of England 177 (Thomas ed. 1836), with Callis, Sewers 78 (1647).
See also Woolrych, Waters 146 (2d ed. 1851).
15. Pratt v. Lamson, 84 Mass. (2 Allen) 275 (1861); Cary v. Daniels, 49
Mass. (8 Met.) 466 (1844); French v. Braintree Mfg. Co., 40 Mass. (23 Pick.)
216 (1839); Carter v. Thurston, 58 N.H. 104 (1877); Haupt's Appeal, 125 Pa.
211, 17 Atl. 436 (1889); I Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England
461 n.1, 751-52 (4th ed. Cooley 1899).
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the stream's total exhaustion by one user might be. If this test is
met the courts have not been much interested in the reasons for di-
verting a stream.1 Unless enough water is returned to accord with
the unpredictable test of reasonable use, it is equally wrong to draw
off water to build an artificial pond,17 to irrigate a farm,' to sink
a permanent weir that turned aside the water,19 to repair a dam with
the intention of forcing out a lower mill privilege through water
deprivation, -0 or for a public officer to divert the water for an
avowedly public purpose.21 In the last mentioned situation, a stream
may be diverted from a public highway only if the diversion will not
affect the rights of landowners upon it or if it lies entirely in public
ground. 22 Otherwise its diversion is a taking which must be compen-
sated, just as a utility or other private entity with eminent domain
powers must compensate a landowner for diverting one or more
streams of water upon or from his land.23
However, merely because a diversion is reasonable and beneficial,
returning the same amount of water to the ancient stream bed before
sending it on to lower riparian owners, does not mean the diverter
is home free. If his diversion has caused the stream to be clogged
with soil so that the stream below becomes choked and the lower lands
are flooded with sand, or his activity has otherwise polluted the stream
waters, he is liable for any damage to lower owners which were caused
by the same.2 4 The courts desire as near an equal sharing of water
among riparian owners as natural conditions will permit and the
judicial decision-makers have ever sought to prevent a monopoly of
the water of a stream by a single user. This has been so whether the
user would destroy other's uses through evaporation of the water in
16. Elliot v. Fitchburg R.R., 64 Mass. (10 Cush.) 191 (1852); Newhall v.
Ireson, 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) 595 (1852); Angell, Watercourses 10-21 (2d ed.
1833). See Bogart & Landon, Modern Industry 179 (2d ed. 1939); Dickinson,
City Region and Regionalism 99 (1956) (giving economic bases for court
regulation).
17. Newhall v. Ireson, supra note 16.
18. Cook v. Hull, 20 Mass. (3 Pick.) 269 (1825).
19. Curtis v. Jackson, 13 Mass. 507 (1816).
20. Bartlett v. Greenleaf, 77 Mass. (11 Gray) 98 (1858).
21. Nealley v. Inhabitants of Bradford, 145 Mass. 561, 14 N.E. 652 (1888).
22. Ibid.
23. Wells v. New Haven & Northampton Co., 151 Mass. 46, 23 N.E. 724
(1890). See Haar, Land-Use Planning 495-96 (1959). On eminent domain in
relation to water rights, see Cooley, Constitutional Law 374 (McLaughlin ed.
1898).
24. Stowell v. Lincoln, 77 Mass. (11 Gray) 434 (1858); Anstee v. Monroe
Light & Fuel Co., 171 Wis. 291, 177 N.W. 26 (1920) ; Mohr v. Gault, 10 Wis. 513
(1860); Y.B. Trin. 13 Henry VII 26B, pl. 4 (1498).
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steam turbines, the absorption of the water in irrigation, the pollution
of the water with acids, or through other means that work a total
destruction of the stream's water resource. Rarely have courts sought
to weigh the relative merits of one user over another, looking only
toward a nice equalization of riparian benefits; but in this policy they
have served indirectly the broader reaches of the public interest in
the water resource as a whole.
In pursuit of this policy, the courts have permitted every riparian
owner to take equal advantage of stream flow in the operation of mills
so long as the rights of others in the same stream are not infringed.
This means that the natural hydraulic lift of the stream must be
passed along to lower riparian owners, diminished only by its reason-
able use as it passes mill after mill, with the understanding that the
use of the water at each privilege may vary greatly.2 The definition of
"natural flow" as set by the courts has been "the flow of the river at
the height which is usual in times of ordinary water, when the current
is not increased by a freshet, or by recent uncommonly heavy rains. 20
With this as the standard, it becomes possible to retain water for a
reserve, so long as a quantity is regularly let down in such amount
as to ultimately equalize the stream's flow to its "normal" capacity.7
In fact, it has been a concern for full economic utilization of stream
resources that has moved the courts to many of their decisions, so that
any "just and reasonable" use will be protected according to the size
and capacity of the stream.28 This does not include the right to keep
the water back for storage only, or for preserving whatever aesthetic
values the appearance of the stream might have, since the interest of
the court lies in the stream's active use rather than in protection of
an absolute property interest. Though it may be a precarious right
the courts protect in requiring water to be let down in a condition,
unheated, unpolluted, and as near to its natural current as reasonable
use will allow, nevertheless, the decisions have acted to protect it. To
let a stream run to waste, even in the presence of lip service to abso-
lute title, is an action repugnant to the mythos of American courts.2 1
25. Gould v. Boston Duck Co., 79 Mass. (13 Gray) 442 (1859); Thurber v.
Martin, 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 394 (1854). This rule is applicable in both the
presence and absence of mill acts.
26. Nemasket Mills v. City of Taunton, 166 Mass. 540, 544, 44 N.E. 609 (1896).
27. Corse v. Dexter, 202 Mass. 31, 88 N.E. 332 (1909). See Hazard Powder
Co. v. Somersville Mfg. Co., 78 Conn. 171, 61 Atl. 519 (1905).
28. Wamesit Power Co. v. Sterling Mills, 158 Mass. 435, 33 N.E. 503 (1893).
29. Sturtevant v. Ford, 280 Mass. 303, 182 N.E. 560 (1932); Inhabitants of
Lynnfield v. Inhabitants of Peabody, 219 Mass. 435, 33 N.E. 503 (1893); Bardwell
v. Ames, 39 Mass. (22 Pick.) 333 (1839); Miller v. Eastern Ry. & Lumber Co.,
84 Wash. 31, 146 Pac. 171 (1915); Bogart & Landon, op. cit. supra note 16, at
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1961/iss2/1
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For this reason, courts have frowned upon obstructions not specifi-
cally authorized by such legislative policies as the Mill Acts or by
administrative successors of these statutes, managed by the different
state public service commissions. A temporary obstruction, so that a
stream's drainage power might be increased, can be a reasonable use,
whatever damage ensues, so long as all is done by the obstructor to
keep the damage minimal.30 However, any permanent or temporary
obstructions done without a purpose to work a common riparian
benefit are not permissible, if any damage to upper or lower riparian
owners will ensue.:1 This does not mean that a builder of roads or
bridges must preserve the stream as nature made it. For economy, he
may narrow or deepen it, cover it with culverts, or, if necessary,
divert it, for his only duty to a non-navigable stream is to see that it
drains as well as it ever did and injures no one in any new course
selected for it in any present or future property value.3 2 In the pres-
ence of permanent obstructions the courts have been known to offer
the obstructor a choice: remove the barrier and let the stream flow
naturally, or supply the stream with its natural flow of water from
some other source.3 3 It is, in short, not any public interest that is to
be directly served. It is instead the property interests of lower
riparians.
This is made most clear where a stream is owned by one or more
persons in its entirety. If one owner has title to the land adjoining a
stream throughout its entire length, he is free to divide its use within
his discretion among any number of lessees who will pay him accord-
ingly. And if he sells his interest in the stream his grantees each take
179 (discusses the thorough economic usage of American streams); Graves,
Uniform State Action 147-48 (1934) (early water resource regulation); Mc-
Dougal & Haber, Property, Wealth, Land 1014 (1948); 5 Pomeroy, Equity
Jurisprudence § 1975, at 4483 (4th ed. 1919).
30. R. Dunkel, Inc. v. V. Barletta Co., 302 MNass. 7, 18 N.E.2d 377 (1938).
31. Lawrence v. Inhabitants of Fairhaven, 71 Mass. (5 Gray) 110 (1855);
Blood v. Nashua & Lowell R.R., 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 137 (1854); Trustees of the
Village of Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. R. 161 (N.Y. 1816); cf. Dickinson v. City of
Worcester, 89 Mass. (7 Allen) 19 (1863); 5 Pomeroy, op. cit. supra note 29,
§ 1976. See also, Hotchkiss, Minerals of Might 177 (1945), which sees stream
obstruction as the physical basis for adequate development, thus showing economic
need at variance with legal necessity.
32. Rowe v. The Granite Bridge Corp., 38 Mass. (21 Pick.) 344 (1838); and
for its effect on future value, see Stimson v. Inhabitants of Brookline, 197 Mass.
568, 83 N.E. 893 (1908).
33. Hittinger Fruit Co. v. City of Cambridge, 218 Mass. 220, 105 N.E. 868
(1914); cf. Colburn v. Richards, 13 Mass. 420 (1816). Natural flow will be
determined by past records; and, if they are not available, the court will select
the figure most likely to serve as the guarantor of justice on the basis of the
available evidence.
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a separate proportion of the waters of the stream and do not stand on
the same footing as persons who derive their interests from owners
who never held- an exclusive right in the entire stream. Likewise,
where owners on a stream agree among themselves to build up a head
of water so that each may enjoy it during certain hours, the courts
will enforce the agreement.3 4
For the sake of the parties to such agreements, particularly those
physically subordinate to upper riparian owners, these contracts had
best be quite specific, since the courts will interpret them against a
background of general water law.35 Since there is no right to an inter-
mittent flow of water, an upper proprietor may run his mill day and
night so that no head of water for lower privileges can build up.30
There is also no right to depend upon an upper riparian owner for
any dam constructed by him, since he has no duty to maintain it for
benefit of lower proprietors. Nor, if he does maintain it, has he an
obligation to keep it in any particular condition to which lower
owners may have grown accustomed. 37 It is, in fact, self-evident that
location must determine who gets the water first; and the lower
owners cannot complain if an upper owner gets full use of the water,
or if, in getting that use, the water necessarily does not reach the
lower owner until need for it has passed.38 These matters, like others,
depend upon the location of the particular interest on the stream. If
a stream naturally silts up, a lower riparian owner cannot complain
when it no longer flows to his land.3 9 This is entirely different from
having his ground inundated by some upper user who has removed
the natural means whereby stream volume had been retarded pre-
viously,40 or losing the water because some public user has drawn the
water away for consumption without compensating him for his loss. 41
34. Crittenden v. Field, 74 Mass. (8 Gray) 621 (1857); cf. Binney v. Phoenix
Cotton Mfg. Co., 128 Mass. 496 (1880); King v. King, 7 Mass. 496 (1811).
See also, Morris, Studies in the History of American Law 244 (1930), which cites
an early case implying the necessity of agreement.
35. Phoenix Cotton Mfg. Co. v. Hazen, 118' Mass. 350 (1875).
36. Mason v. Whitney, 193 Mass. 152, 78 N.E. 881 (1906).
37. Weare v. Chase, 93 Me. 264, 44 Atl. 900 (1899) ; Taft v. Bridgeton Worsted
Co., 237 Mass. 385, 130 N.E. 48 (1921). See Ware v. Allen, 140 Mass. 513, 5 N.E.
629 (1886).
38. Hinckley v. Nickerson, 117 Mass. 213 (1875) ; cf. Inhabitants of Brookline
v. Mackintosh, 133 Mass. 215 (1882).
39. Duncan v. Bancroft, 110 Mass. 267 (1872).
40. Grant v. Kuglar, 81 Ga. 637, 8 S.E. 878 (1889); Mears v. Dole, 135 Mass.
508 (1833).-
41. Nealley v. Inhabitants of Bradford, 145 Mass. 561, 14 N.E. 652 (1888);
5 Pomeroy, op. cit. supra note 29, § 1977. This is the rule even though some
businesses of riparians would be aided thereby. 27 R.C.L. Waters § 35 (1920).
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While a single owner of a stream is unconfined in his activities at com-
mon law, a user on a stream owned by several people must act so as
not to destroy its value to the others.42 For this reason a lower ri-
parian owner, even though the water be now flowing over his ground,
cannot turn it onto another's land without incurring liability to the
upper owners, since they have a right of continuous drainage in that
watercourse which would be lost once it was closed; and no drainage
onto another's property, even with permission, constitutes a sufficient
substitute, since permission may be retracted.4 3 It is true that a super-
fluity or a deficiency of water might force extreme measures for a
brief time; and if they are necessary, reasonable, and beneficial, there
will be no liability for any damages to those who might have foreseen
their occurrence.44
Courts have been reluctant to put any limitation upon the use of
water in streams for various industrial purposes. Unless a grantor of
a mill privilege, for instance, has put a strict limitation upon uses to
which the mill site may be put, the courts will imply none, since the
tendency is to read the grant as merely determining the amount of
power conveyed rather than as a limitation upon its use. The use will
be limited only by the nature of the stream and the functions to which
it can be put45 To preserve that usefulness a riparian owner is em-
powered to keep the stream cleansed; and he may go upon the land of
others to see that it is clear and to clear it if it is not, for he cannot
be made to depend upon the activity of others who might have no in-
terest in keeping the stream clean.4 6 He has the right to have the
water come to him clear of matter dangerous in his use of it and he
may cleanse it to get that result, being liable to no one in his use of the
water, unless he has injured them or they have an interest in his
activities.4Y
These rules, of course, are those as worked out by the courts in
their job of creating case precedents for the making of the common
law. Before modern public policy they must take a subordinate posi-
42. Hapgood v. Brown, 102 Mass. 451 (1869). This applies even more to
injunctions, Westbrook Mfg. Co. v. Warren, 77 Me. 437, 1 Atl. 246 (1885).
43. Hastings v. Livermore, 81 Mass. (15 Gray) 10 (1860).
44. Sumner v. Foster, 24 Mass. (7 Pick.) 32 (1828).
45. Tourtellot v. Phelps, 70 Mass. (4 Gray) 370 (1855).
46. Prescott v. Williams, 46 Mass. (5 Met.) 429 (1843).
47. Soule v. Russell, 54 Mass. (13 Met.) 436 (1847); Prescott v. Williams,
supra note 46; 27 R.C.L. Waters § 12 (1920), which says riparian rights "must
yield to the demands of public commercial necessities." At common law the writ
of reparare facias was the one brought when a servient tenement failed to keep
in repair such riparian appurtenances as the river bank, 1 Public Works in
Medieval Law 310-11 (Flower ed. 1915).
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tion. The law has come a long way from the time when it was suffi-
cient to find that a man who owned both banks, and hence the bed
of a stream, was free to do with that stretch much as he willed. 48
Today the state, or the federal government where the state is sub-
sidiary, may change the rule of reasonable use and "authorize the
appropriation of the flowing waters for such purposes as it may deem
to be in the public interest." 49 The modern state is tied inextricably to
no doctrine, and may cut itself loose at any time when new considera-
tions of public policy, based (as were those in the past) upon the
economic knowledge of the day, are brought forward and are found to
be in conformity with constitutional property rights.
III. THE PURITY OF THE WATERCOURSE
In the absence of statute, the courts have generally refused to set
up priorities of water use, although at one time or another certain
industrial users have been given a preferred status and domestic users
have always had special consideration.
It is inevitable, if water in a stream is used, that it be roiled and
slightly corrupted by earth and waste; but unless this corruption is
sufficient to materially injure another user of the stream, it is per-
missible at common law.50 There is a duty not to corrupt a stream so
that others are deprived of a reasonable use of it; and that duty in-
cludes filtering out poisons before draining one's refuse into the
waters of the stream.51 To fail to do so is as bad as if one were to turn
privy water into a small stream incapable of carrying the burden,
thereby flooding a whole area with stinking, infected water.52
The courts recognize that streams have a certain limited capacity
to purify themselves which is destroyed by the dumping of chemicals
or other wastes in overlarge quantities.5 3 There is no right in any
riparian owner to pollute a stream and what will be permitted him in
a thinly settled community will be denied in one thickly populated.
There is, instead, an opposite right to receive the water undefiled so
that it may be used and not to receive it so full of acids and metal
scourings that it eats up hides washed in it or disintegrates machinery
which it is used to move.5 4 Nor is it important what the size of the
48. Mayo v. Quimby, 3 Dane Abr. 4 (1799).
49. Amory v. Commonwealth, 321 Mass. 240, 246, 72 N.E.2d 549, 554 (1947).
50. Canfield v. Andrew, 54 Vt. 1 (1882).
51. MacNamara v. Taft, 196 Mass. 597, 83 N.E. 310 (1907).
52. Jackman v. Arlington Mills, 137 Mass. 277 (1884).
53. Dwight Printing Co. v. City of Boston, 122 Mass. 583 (1877).
54. Collins Mfg. Co. v. Wickwire Spencer Steel Co., 14 F.2d 871 (D. Mass.
1926); Bumbarger v. Walker, 393 Pa. 143, 142 A.2d 171 (1958) (applying the
same rule to the effects of mine waste dumped into a ditch that pollutes a farm
spring); Lepper v. Wisconsin Sugar Co., 146 Wis. 494, 128 N.W. 54 (1910).
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user hurt by the pollution bears in relation to the polluter. 5 A farm
wife with a few cows is entitled to get stream water they can drink
even if a mill worth a thousand times her cows' value lies above her
farm. 6
It is true that in earlier days other standards were briefly at-
tempted. Certain favored industries, such as sawmills, were permitted
to dump refuse in the water, since the courts believed they could not
run at all if other rules were to be followed. 57 Other stream users,
such as municipalities, were allowed to convert open streams into
open sewers with court sanction, on the justification that any other
course of action would destroy the rising urban-industrial complexes.58
But these were situations which neither nature nor the law could
indefinitely tolerate. With the arrival of more factories and heavier
urban populations, pollution began to reach such an intolerable state
that the courts soon restored the old rule that required users of water
to return it to the stream in a substantially unpolluted and cooled
condition.59
The courts have refused to put specifically any higher value on
either agricultural, manufacturing, or commercial uses, whatever they
may have done to incidentally further one at the expense of the other
in specific cases. Circumstances may change so that what was once
a valuable land use is not so now in relation to the water resource;
and, consequently, the courts have refused the palm of preference to
either irrigation, or factories, or water companies, or other users.60
Because of this refusal to make functional distinctions, the ordinary
standards of negligence, particularly in cases of well poisoning, are
often applied, so that proof of reasonable care, scope of risk, and
limit of damages must often be heard.
Where a livery stable's well is filled with an escape of poisonous gas
from a neighboring mill and the horses die after drinking it, the
55. Parker v. American Woolen Co., 195 Mass. 591, 81 N.E. 468 (1907).
56. The illustration of the cows is from MacNamara v. Taft, 196 Mass. 597,
83 N.E. 310 (1907).
57. Red River Roller Mills v. Wright, 30 Minn. 249, 15 N.W. 167 (1883);
Palmer v. Mulligan, 3 Caines 307 (N.Y. 1805); Jacobs v. Allard, 42 Vt. 303
(1869); Jones & Powell's Case, Palm. 536, 81 Eng. Rep. 1208 (K.B. 1664).
58. City of Valparaiso v. Hagen, 153 Ind. 337, 54 N.E. 1062 (1899); City
of Richmond v. Test, 18 Ind. App. 482, 48 N.E. 610 (1897).
59. Winchell v. City of Waukesha, 110 Wis. 101, 85 N.W. 668 (1901); Aldred's
Case, 9 Co. Rep. 57b, 77 Eng. Rep. 816 (K.B. 1611). See Lewis v. Stein, 16 Ala.
214 (1849) ; Para Rubber Shoe Co. v. City of Boston, 139 Mass. 155, 29 N.E. 544
(1885).
60. For an excellent policy discussion on agricultural versus industrial uses,
see Newcomb v. Smith, 2 Pin. 131 (Wis. 1849). See also, Bent v. Wheeler, 3
Dane Abr. 16 (1800); Cummings v. Barrett, 64 Mass. (10 Cush.) 186 (1852).
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owner must prove that they died from the mill's poisons before a
recovery against the mill will be allowed.61 One whose well is polluted
with gasoline must show that the harm could come only from the oil
storage tanks of his particular defendant and he cannot make his
case by showing repairs on the defendant's premises after the alleged
pollution.6 2 A dredge owner, drawing up garbage from the harbor
bottom, is responsible for the value of all lobsters poisoned in nearby
cars if he does nothing to prevent pollution.6 3 In each of these cases,
the standard tests in negligence matters must be met and the situa-
tions are not treated as differing in any way from hit-and-run ac-
cidents . 4
The weapon of injunctive relief, in comparison, is particularly
useful in the field of water law. Where the statutes have not come
to the aid of the common law and where certain uses cannot be abated
as nuisances, a person would be without an effective remedy in the
midst of a superabundance of causes of action, if it were not for the
equitable forms of relief. Only equity can grant, in many particulars,
that final relief from injury which is what persons injured in their
property rights desire. Illustrations by example are perhaps the best
way of revealing this.
One stream user may enjoin another from washing sheep skins in
the stream and polluting it with arsenic, since it is this sort of contin-
uing nuisance over which legal remedies have slight control.65 Nor
will an injunction be denied a private person suffering a present in-
jury merely because some state agency has power to stop the par-
ticular use of the water or has authorized the waste disposal methods
in use.66 A town that dumps its sewage into a mill pond will be en-
joined from doing it further and under the mandatory provisions of
the decree will be compelled to clear the watercourse of refuse it has
61. Sherman v. Fall River Iron Works Co., 87 Mass. (5 Allen) 213 (1862).
62. Gauvieau v. Gulf Refining Co., 288 Mass. 54, 192 N.E. 220 (1934) ; Enders
v. Sinclair Refining Co., 220 Wis. 254, 263 N.W. 568 (1936).
63. Smith v. Bay State Dredging & Contradting Co., 272 Mass. 183, 172 N.E.
67 (1930). See also Kuehn v. City of Milwaukee, 92 Wis. 263, 65 N.W. 1030
(1896).
64. As codified by Mass. Ann. Laws c. 92, § 17 and c. 111, §§ 5, 17 (1954), the
states have increasingly concerned themselves with state control over all sources
of water pollution, with administrative effort being made to regulate the situa-
tion.
65. Harris v. Mackintosh, 133 Mass. 228 (1882). See also Greene v. Nunne-
macher, 36 Wis. 50 (1874).
66. Hasslinger v. Village of Hartland, 234 Wis. 201, 290 N.W.2d 647 (1940)
(abatement of nuisance); Briggson v. City of Viroqua, 264 Wis. 47, 58 N.W.
2d 546 (1953) (applying the same rule in the presence of eminent domain powers
in local boards by permitting an equity action for a prohibitory injunction).
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deposited.6 7 Naturally, general rules apply here too; and no injunction
or other equitable relief will issue where the courts feel the legal rem-
edy to be adequate, especially where that legal remedy is the payment
provision of some eminent domain action by an authorized power.6 8
Even where an injunction would have been proper otherwise, it will
not be granted where a water user has rested on his rights, knowing
that he had them, knowing that he was hurt if he did not enforce
them, and, yet, still failing to do so. 9 But, aside from these difficulties,
equity remains a useful remedy, since it is adaptable and binding,
capable of being modeled to fit the needs of the parties, and perpetual
in its effect.70 It is as flexible in its nature as any order of a judicial
tribunal can be and when combined with a master's hearing comes as





The courts have created a special category in water law cases for
the problem of a supply of pure drinking water for domestic con-
sumption. Here, the courts have often gone to comparative extremes
to protect the purity of a water supply. Despite their ancient rights,
for example, the Massachusetts public can be excluded from a great
pond used for supplying a municipality with drinking water; and the
court will not hear whether or not the would-be users would pollute
the water by their activity.72 Once a stream was taken as a water
67. Middlesex Co. v. City of Lowell, 149 Mass. 509, 21 N.E. 872 (1889).
68. Pomeroy, op. cit. supra note 29, which considers in detail the equitable
remedy vis-a-vis water.
69. Fay v. Proprietors of the Salem & Danvers Aqueduct, 91 Mass. (9 Allen)
577 (1865).
70. Inhabitants of Plymouth v. Russell Mills, 89 Mass. (7 Allen) 438 (1863).
71. Bemis v. Upham, 30 Mass. (12 Pick.) 169 (1832).
72. Sprague v. Minon, 195 Mass. 581, 81 N.E. 284 (1907). The control of
great pond waters lies in the Commonwealth under the Ordinances of 1641 and
1647, applying to all lakes over 10 acres in extent not privately owned prior to
1647, Hittinger v. Eames, 121 Mass. 539 (1877). Having this control, the
Commonwealth may dispose of the waters without compensation to riparians on
streams rising therein and may grant licenses in their use to private parties,
Dodge v. Inhabitants of Rockport, 199 Mass. 274, 85 N.E. 172 (1908). The public
is normally protected in its rights in the waters for fishing, fowling, boating,
swimming, ice-skating, or any domestic, agricultural, or manufacturing purpose
for which the water can be used, Potter v. Howe, 141 Mass. 357, 6 N.E. 233
(1886). The practical effect depends upon access and on this the early legislation
is silent since, at that time, the littoral lands were wild. Consequently, in the
absence of wild land, or a state-owned access point, or a privately dedicated
ingress-egress, or a commercially operated amusement, the public can be, and is,
excluded by littoral owners, Slater v. Gunn, 170 Mass. 509, 49 N.E. 1017 (1898).
Even ice-cutters cannot take ice from over-flow waters, so strictly preserved are
the rights of littoral owners, Paine v. Woods, 108 Mass. 160 (1871). Great
pond waters have been compared to tide waters and navigable streams, in which
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supply under public authority, even in jurisdictions that permitted
prescriptive pollution rights, such powers were thereby lost and be-
came subjectto condemnation. 73
But the courts have also been places of last resort for economic
appeals that have struck harshly at beliefs in the priority of the
public health. Public authorities have been forbidden to order the
owners of reservoirs for industrial water supply to fill them up in
order to protect the public health.7 4 The courts have refused to pro-
hibit a continuing polluter from pouring arsenic into a public water
supply, even in violation of a statute, because the business doing it
was respectable and the damage slight, since the water was filtered
through earth before use.75 The courts have found an industrial
user beyond the terms of a statute forbidding pouring waste into the
tributary of a water supply, because his overflow waste ran into a
swamp from which the town's pond drew its source for the town's
drinking water,76 and the courts have refused to enjoin the corruption
of a city's water supply by drainage from a piggery, because the
mayor of the complaining town was not the proper party to bring
the action.
7 7
It is plain, therefore, that in the matter of water purity, even in
relation to water for human consumption, the courts do not dispense
an even justice. They forbid in one case what they permit in another;
and on the same facts one jurisdiction finds a way of reaching conduct
the public has the paramount interest but access to which may be cut off by
adjoining landowners, Attorney General v. Jamaica Pond Aqueduct Corp., 133
Mass. 361 (1882). Only by special grant of the legislature (most unlikely today)
can there be created in the waters themselves any exclusive interest in private
persons. Some have regarded the great ponds as surprising exceptions, but
actually they are similar to the commons sans nombre of the Jacobean period that
saw their creation.
73. Martin v. Gleason, 139 Mass. 183, 29 N.E. 664 (1855). In fact, 27 R.C.L.
Waters § 136 (1920) says, "[I]n no case can a prescriptive right of pollution
be acquired which is superior to the right of a state to exercise its police power."
74. Watuppa Reservoir Co. v. Mackenzie, 132 Mass. 71 (1882). See also
Douglass v. State, 4 Wis. 403 (1855). For an' early statute on this problem, see
"An Act relative to mill ponds," II Mich. Terr. Laws 1828, at 690 (1874 ed.).
75. Inhabitants of Brookline v. Mackintosh, 133 Mass. 215 (1882). For a "red
in tooth and claw" case, see Danaher v. City of Brooklyn, 4 Civ. Proc. R. 286
(1883), aff'd, 51 Hun 563, 4 N.Y. Supp. 312 (1889), aff'd, 119 N.Y. 241, 23 N.E.
745 (18905.
76. Selectmen of Rockport v. Elwell, 219 Mass. 287, 106 N.E. 994 (1914);
Green v. Ashland Water Co., 101 Wis. 258, 77 N.W. 722 (1898).
77. Mayor of Cambridge v. Dean, 300 Mass. 174, 14 N.E.2d 163 (1938). For
other grim examples of judicial preoccupation with technicalities, see Bucking-
ham v. Plymouth Water Co., 142 Pa. 221, 21 At]. 824 (1891); Commonwealth
v. Towanda Water Works, 22 Weekly Notes of Cases 429 (Pa. 1888).
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that another is unable to conceive of as prohibitable.7 8 Perhaps, be-
cause of the exigencies of pleading, this is inevitable in judicial
proceedings; but if this is so, it means that for these reasons and for
the reason that judicial remedies are always exclusively related to
the solution of single, litigated cases lawyers need not be surprised
that the judicial-orientation in water law has been replaced by another
view that looks primarily to the administrative agency. This is no-
where more apparent than in the case of water pollution matters
where the protection of the public health requires summary relief.
THE EFFECT OF NAVIGABILITY
Indirectly related to the problem of pollution is the matter of
stream navigability. In fact the early pollution legislation was largely
designed to keep open waters upon which early communities were
dependent for communication and trade. Only the solution of these
gross problems have freed the law makers for consideration of such
a comparatively subtle issue as the bio-oxygen demand of wastes
upon water. Yet, divorced from this aspect of navigability, are larger
issues to which substantial differences in interpretation have attached.
For example, although the civil law declares every stream navigable
which can bear river traffic, the common law holds that stream nav-
igable only in that part in which the tide ebbs and flows. Exceptions
to the common law existed at an early date so that the king's agents
were empowered to keep clear the great rivers in which the bulk of
the navigation for internal trade were carried on.71' Those American
jurisdictions which profess to follow the common law most closely,
and whose proximity to the ocean makes this physically feasible, have
always added a proviso that boating and rafting are free to the public
upon all streams capable of floating them. 0 Also in these jurisdic-
tions, not every ditch capable of carrying a shallow-draft boat and in
which salt water ebbs and flows is navigable. In the absence of a
statute, the courts normally require a stream to be usable regularly
for some commercial purpose of transportation in the service of trade
78. Compare Green v. Ashland Water Co., 101 Wis. 258, 77 N.W. 722 (1898),
with Stubbs v. City of Rochester, 226 N.Y. 516, 124 N.E. 137 (1919). Also com-
pare Howell v. M'Coy, 3 Rawle 256 (Pa. 1832), with Jacobs v. Allard, 42 Vt. 303
(1869).
79. Murphy, English Water Law Doctrines Before 1400, 1 Am. J. Legal Hist.
103, 110 (1957).
80. Blood v. Nashua & L. R.R., 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 137 (1854) (dictum);
Ingraham v. Wilkinson, 21 Mass. (4 Pick.) 268 (1826) (dictum); Angell, Tide-
Waters 62 (1826), gives the English rule and its American derivatives. Carson
v. Blazer, 2 Binn. 475 (Pa. 1810), was the first American case to hold fresh
water navigable and to refuse title in the river bed of such a great stream as the
Susquehanna to riparians.
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or agriculture21 Since Bracton's time at least, the waters of navigable
streams have been public property; and their abuse as avenues of
commerce has not been correctable in private suits, but only in public
indictments, 82 although from the time of Glanvil private persons,
suffering special injury as a result of this abuse, have had the right
to recover their damages in private civil actions from those parties
who are the especial provable cause . 3
Riverside owners, who can refuse access across their lands to the
navigable streams, cannot themselves be deprived of access to the
streams, even by the state, unless compensation is paid for this loss
of access. Normally, as part of his riparian rights, a riverside owner
can build wharves and docks on the flats; but when the flats are
overflowed he cannot exclude the public from boating on that part of
the river, although he may forbid them the use of his structures
in every instance except one of peril to the river users.8 4 The same
limitation applies to bridge builders who may sink their piers so long
as the navigability of the stream is not thereby destroyed or unreason-
ably diminished. 5 This duty, however, is enforcible only by the public
prosecutor; and in the 19th century, when railroads dealt roughly
with their river competitors, many a bargeman, who was bothered by
piers that an indifferent prosecutor refused to do anything about,
must have longed to blow the obstruction out of his way as one hardy
spirit did.86
Problems of strean navigability have sunk into the background
of the law. Today it is primarily a question of federal against state
jurisdiction, or an assertion of public interest against private riparian
interest; and in such instances it serves mainly as a springboard for
stream control for purposes unrelated in reality to navigation. The
courts may continue to speak of navigation as the operative constitu-
tional factor; and the legislatures may be led thereby to set out
navigation as the primary legislative purpose in the underlying policy
behind river improvement programs; but today the concern is truly
81. Commonwealth v. Vincent, 108 Mass. 441 (1871); Rowe v. Granite Bridge
Corp., 38 Mass. (21 Pick.) 344 (1838).
82. Murphy, op. cit. supra note 79, at 104-05.
83. Franklin Wharf Co. v. City of Portland, 67 Me. 46 (1877); Lawrence v.
Inhabitants of Fairhaven, 71 Mass. (5 Gray) 110 (1855); Borden v. Vincent, 41
Mass. (24 Pick.) 301 (1839); Hatch v. Dwight, 17 Mass. 289 (1821); Rex v.
Medley, 6 Car. & P. 292, 172 Eng. Rep. 1246 (K.B. 1834).
84. Home for Aged Women v. Commonwealth, 202 Mass. 422, 89 N.E. 124
(1909). In fact, a lease of land in a navigable river lying between high and low
water mark by an adjacent riparian is void as contrary to public policy. Elliott,
Contracts § 782 (1913).
85. See Southern Ry. v. Weidenbrenner, 61 Ind. App. 314, 109 N.E. 926 (1915).
86. Commonwealth v. Tolman, 149 Mass. 229, 21 N.E. 377 (1889).
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over such problems as sedimentation, pollution, flooding, and water
shortage. The chief function of the rules of law developed by the
courts in relation to navigation, so far as these needs are concerned,
lies in the broad assertion of public interest traditionally made in the
use of navigable waters. Today the main issue is the extension of the
principle of a similar, or stronger, 'public interest in the entire water
resource wherever located87
IRRIGATION
Because of the rights of riparians to receive their water either in
its natural condition or subject to other riparians' reasonable uses,
and because irrigation can so easily destroy the physical basis of
such a right, the courts have refused to find any abstract right of
irrigation, with specifically permissible and forbidden techniques.
Rather it has been left to the determination of each judge in particular
cases to weigh the hardships involved. The only adamant rule is that
no one may have the waters of an entire stream for irrigation. Every
man may irrigate his fields by dipping water from the brook, or by
letting it run through runnels in his ground carried by its natural
87. What has been said concerning streams has an almost equal applicability
to lakes and their littoral lands. Ziegler, Water Use Under Common Law Doc-
trines, in Water Resources and the Law 51, 52 (1958). Owners of the littoral
on non-navigable lakes or private ponds own them as absolutely as they own their
banks. Richards v. Gauffret, 145 Mass. 486, 14 N.E. 535 (1888); Luscher v.
Reynolds, 153 Ore. 625, 56 P.2d 1158 (1936). If but a part of the littoral is
owned, title runs at descending angles to the center of the lake in favor of
the littoral owner. United States v. Ladley, 42 F.2d 474 (D. Idaho, 1930). Others
will be excluded with all their improvements unless title has changed by opera-
tion of adverse possession. Westhampton Reservoir Recreation Corp. v. Hodder,
307 Mass. 288, 29 N.E.2d 913 (1940); Shaffer v. Baylor's Lake Ass'n, 392 Pa.
493, 141 A.2d 583 (1958). Some states have followed Massachusetts' lead in
relation to her great pond ordinances, and have declared all lakes over ten
acres in extent affected with a public interest. Compare Inhabitants of West
Roxbury v. Stoddard, 89 Mass. (7 Allen) 158 (1863), with Holle v. Drudge, 190
Ind. 520, 129 N.E. 229 (1920). But navigable lakes are in a radically different
category. Compare Clifton v. Watuppa Reservoir Co., 243 Mass. 198, 137 N.E.
362 (1922), with United States Leather Co. v. City of Lynn, 293 Mass. 14, 199
N.E. 313 (1935). There, the littoral owner has title to high water mark. Church-
ill Co. v. Kingsbury, 178 Cal. 554, 174 Pac. 329 (1918). But see Flisrand v.
Madson, 35 S.D. 457, 152 N.W. 796 (1915). Everything therein, including the
bottom and any islands, belongs to the state. Attorney General v. Herrick, 190
Mass. 307, 76 N.E. 1045 (1906). The littoral owner upon a navigable lake or
great pond has all the rights of the general public with the added advantage of
easier access. Los Angeles Athletic Club v. City of Santa Monica, 63 Cal. App.
2d 795, 147 P.2d 976 (1944); People's Ice Co. v. Davenport, 149 Mass. 322, 21
N.E. 385 (1889); Rowell v. Doyle, 131 Mass. 474 (1881). However, this superior
power remains in the state as the representative of the people.
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force;8s but industrial jurisdictions have forbidden him to create
a reserve for future irrigation purposes where lower mill privileges
in active use would be thereby destroyed.89
An irrigator may even divert a stream so that he may better use
the water on his land, so long as he does not exhaust its supply and
returns it, unchoked by earth, to the original bed of the watercourse.9
Conversely, an irrigator, using a flow of water running over the
surface of the ground to irrigate so unlikely a crop as clay for bricks,
cannot be deprived of it by an upper riparian who has diverted it for
his own use.91 A reasonable and beneficial use of water for irrigation
purposes, not interfering with another's reasonable and beneficial
use of the same water and not harmful to anyone else, will be pro-
tected by the courts whatever its economic purpose. This is so
whether the court is dealing with land suffering from a deficiency
of water or a crop that requires a sqrplus of water.9 2
Because the courts have refused to meet the problem of irrigation in
a forthright manner, setting forth predictable results upon known fact
situations, there has had to be a resort to the legislature. The courts
ought not to be held blamable, perhaps, since it has been their purpose
to provide justice in individual cases, with the result that contra-
dictory uses have been maintained as equally valid. And, in any event,
with the problems of working arid lands looming so large, legislative
policy-making would have been a necessity whatever the work of the
courts. Nothing makes this clearer than the need in Massachusetts
and Wisconsin to enact special acts to make possible the growing of so
economically minor (if culturally vital) a crop as cranberries, due
to the gross demand for water made by this plant. In the presence
of economic demands requiring over-all physical changes in order
to carry them through, nothing less than the full power of the
legislature is sufficient, for such functions are not within the proper
province of the courts.93
88. Weston v. Alden, 8 Mass. 135 (1811).
89. Anthony v. Lapham, 22 Mass. (5 Pick.) 175 (1827) ; Colburn v. Richards,
13 Mass. 420 (1816). Even in arid states an irrigation company is not justified
in withholding water from contractees in order to build a reserve against a
possible future shortage. 15 R.C.L. Irrigation § 34 (1917).
90. Newhall v. Ireson, 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) 595 (1851); Mohr v. Gault, 10 Wis.
455 (1860) (applying similar rules in drainage cases); Embrey v. Owen, 6
Welsb., Hurls. & Gord. 353, 86 Rev. Rep. 331 (Ex. 1851) ; Martz, in IVa American
Law of Property § 28.56, at 163-64 (1954).
91. Macomber v. Godfrey, 108 Mass. 219 (1871).
92. Weston v. Alden, 8 Mass. 136 (1811). For statutory language illustrative
of this point, see Mass. Ann. Laws c. 253, § 39 (1956).
93. See generally Haber, Introductory Essay, in Water Allocation in the
Eastern United States xxv (1956). This section does not deal with irrigation
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THE DAMMING OF THE WATERWAYS
Beginning with the statute of 13 Anne (1714) in the Province of
Massachusetts, American legislatures have adopted a public policy
encouraging the erection of mills that would develop the water power
resources and increase the general prosperity of the entire-community.
To accomplish this end the legislatures adopted what amounted to a
rule of prior appropriation for mills in the use of streams, so that the
first mill built might destroy other mill sites by its operation and
stand protected under the law. The builder of the first mill on an
undeveloped stretch of river might flood mill sites above him and
stand off the flowing of his mill privilege from below, so long as his
mill was active. This did not mean he could determine the uses of
the river below him, but it did mean that he might use the stream
in a reasonable manner, considering the "force and magnitude of the
current, its height and velocity, the state of improvement in the
country in regard to mills and machinery, and the use of water as
a propelling power, the general usage of the country in similar cases,
and all other circumstances bearing upon the question of fitness and
propriety in the use of the water in the particular case."'94
In building his dam, the mill-owner was not responsible for in-
cidental damage caused by his pond,95 but he was not allowed to hold
water back unreasonably, 6 barring some special privilege, or else he
would have been liable to any injured lower users. In the same way,
a lower mill owner was liable for setting water back upon an existing
mill,97 though he was not barred from getting a maximum use of the
stream by setting the water back to the raceway of the upper mill,
so long as he did not affect its current operation.9 8
from high capacity wells. For this common modern technique, see Calabresa,
Water in Rural Areas, in Proceedings, Conference on Water Management in Soil
Conservation Districts, U.S. Forest Products Laboratory (1957).
94. Thurber v. Martin, 68 Mass. (2 Gray) 394, 396 (1854). The first statute
is now incorporated in Mass. Ann. Laws c. 253 (1956). Similar statutes are, "An
Act for the support and regulation of Mills," II Mich. Terr. Laws 1824, at 192
(1874 ed.); "An Act for the regulation of Mills and Mill-ponds," III Mich. Terr.
Laws 1833, at 1175 (1874 ed.); "An Act in relation to Mills and Mill-dams," Wis.
Terr. Laws 1839-40, No. 48; Wis. Rev. Stat. c. 56 (1858). These statutes reflect
in their jockeying the deep but conflicting community interest. On analogy of
prior appropriation doctrine, see Haar & Gordon, Legislative Change of Water
Law in Massachusetts, in Water Allocation in the Eastern United States 1,
36-37 (1956). On the first developer's powers, see Barrett v. Parsons, 64 Mass.
(10 Cush.) 367 (1852); French v. Braintree Mfg. Co., 40 Mass. (23 Pick.) 216
(1839).
95. Duncan v. New England Power Co., 250 Mass. 228, 145 N.E. 427 (1924).
96. Clarke v. French, 122 Mass. 419 (1877).
97. Gleason v. Assabet Mfg. Co., 101 Mass. 72 (1869).
98. Brown v. Dean, 123 Mass. 254 (1877); Bottomly v. Chism, 102 Mass.
463 (1869); Sumner v. Tileston, 24 Mass. (7 Pick.) 198 (1828).
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Under the mill acts, a mill owner had the right to flow the land of
upper landowners in order to form his mill-pond; and, once a sheriff's
jury or a referee or arbitrator had determined the height of his dam,
the extent of his flowage, and the assessment of the damages, he had
to act in accordance with such findings or forfeit his statutory rights
and become liable at common law. However, so strong was the public
policy behind the mill acts, that until bound by a specific finding, he
might vary both the height of his dam and the extent of his flowage
without further liability than an assessment under the statute or, if
he chose it himself, an action at common law. 9 He acquired no title
to the land flowed, whose owner retained the right to use it for any
purpose until flowed and even after flowage to use the water for any
reasonable purpose that did not adversely affect the mill.100 The owner
of the flowed land also retained the use of the water before it reached
the mill's pond, so long as that use too did not prevent the pond, and
the mill, from fulfilling their proper function.' 0 ' The dam had to be
built to adequately protect third parties in case of a breakthrough ;102
and, because of another public policy, a fishway had to be left through
the dam for the passage of migratory fish accustomed to swim up that
stream.10 3 Once the owner of a mill-site had signified that he intended
to develop it and had begun to vigorously push on the work, that site
was effectively appropriated and could not be flowed by the owner
of another site. Once developed, he could defend it at law, until
abandoned-and abandoned not merely by non-use, but by the removal
of the mill or dam or by some other expression of intent similarly
emphatic. 0 4 Anyone claiming damage from a mill-dam could not
remove it by self-help, or resort to any other remedy than that pro-
99. Clement Mfg. Co. v. Wood, 162 Mass. 173, 38 N.E. 444 (1894); Brady v.
Blackinton, 113 Mass. 238 (1873); Green Bay & Miss. Canal Co. v. Telulah
Paper Co., 140 Wis. 417, 122 N.W. 1062 (1909).
100. Storm v. Manchaug Co., 95 Mass. (13 Allen) 10 (1866); Wood v. Edes,
84 Mass. (2 Allen) 578 (1861).
101. Paine v. Woods, 108 Mass. 160 (1871); Union Falls Power Co. v.
Marinette County, 238 Wis. 134, 298 N.W. 598 (1941).
102. Gray v. Harris, 107 Mass. 492 (1871).
103. Commissioners on Inland Fisheries v. Holyoke Water Power Co., 104
Mass. 446 (1870). Another overriding public policy led to the prohibition against
the flowing of public land. Inhabitants of Cheshire v. Adams & Cheshire
Reservoir Co., 119 Mass. 356 (1876); Commonwealth v. Stevens, 27 Mass. (10
Pick.) 247 (1830).
104. Eddy v. Chase, 140 Mass. 471, 5 N.E. 306 (1886); Burnham v. Story, 85
Mass. (3 Allen) 378 (1862); Newcomb v. Smith, 2 Pin. 131 (Wis. 1849); Luning
v. State, 2 Pin. 215 (Wis. 1849).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1961/iss2/1
WATER LAW
vided by statute, even though that should have been admittedly in-
adequate.'05
The reasoning behind these mill acts was the assurance of the
operation of water mills financed out of the capital of the less enter-
prising riparian landowners. It was in the nature of a forced loan
from agriculture for the benefit of a growing industrial structure.
To be sure, the legislature sought to protect the expropriated, first
by annual payments for the land flowed, and then by giving them the
choice between these and a lump sum payment, so that they would not
bear the entire burden of the mill-owner's success uncompensated.'06
So strong was the policy in its heyday that a mill owner could flood
even the home of an upper owner to form his pond ;107 or form a
reserve pond far above his mill so long as it was on the same stream ;1os
or build his dam from one shore owned by him to another under his
title.10° Indeed, if he could show the mill pond benefited the upper
landowner more than it damaged him he had no need to pay him any-
thing,l ° since one owner on a stream owes no particular duty to any
other beyond that imposed by statute and the common law rule of
equal, reasonable, and beneficial use.1 '
The whole motivating force behind this entire battery of legal
precedents lay in the extraction from the waterways of the states the
maximum beneficial use for every industrial purpose. A contemporary
economic demand produced a reaction in the legislature sufficient to
make its realization possible, despite entrenched rules of the common
law. 11- It was an effort on the part of the 19th century to make
105. Smith v. Agawam Canal Co., 84 Mass. (2 Allen) 355 (1861); Baird v.
Hunter, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 555 (1832).
106. Eames v. New England Worsted Co., 52 Mass. (11 Met.) 570 (1846);
Fowler v. Holbrook, 34 Mass. (17 Pick.) 188 (1835). Flowing agreements were
enforcible only under seal. Cobb v. Fisher, 121 Mass. 169 (1876). No mill owner
was responsible for flowing damages inflicted by his predecessor in interest.
Holmes v. Drew, 24 Mass. (7 Pick.) 141 (1828). For an explanation of resource
exploitation as a substitute for capital, see Hyams, Soil & Civilization 147-48
(1952).
107. McNally v. Smith, 94 Mass. (12 Allen) 455 (1866).
108. Drake v. Hamilton Woolen Co., 99 Mass. 574 (1868); Bates v. Weymouth
Iron Co., 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) 548 (1851).
109. Bliss v. Rice, 34 Mass. (17 Pick.) 23 (1835); Jewell v. Gardiner, 12 Mass.
311 (1815).
110. Avery v. Van Deusen, 22 Mass. (5 Pick.) 182 (1827).
111. Inhabitants of Shrewsbury v. Smith, 66 Mass. (12 Cush.) 177 (1853). The
policy of flooding applies only to mill privileges and not to municipal water
suppliers to give them power to create reservoirs. Davenport v. Town of Danvers,
332 Mass. 580, 126 N.E.2d 530 (1955).
112. Duncan v. New England Power Co., 225 Mass. 155, 113 N.E. 781 (1916);
Fiske v. Framingham Mfg. Co., 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 68 (1831); Fisher v. Horicon
Iron and Mfg. Co., 10 Wis. 351 (1860); Hurst, Law & Conditions Of Freedom
In Nineteenth-Century United States 25, 63 (1956).
Washington University Open Scholarship
114 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY
private capital serve dual purposes so that industrial enterprise might
be financed out of the abundant natural resources of the day rather
than through the investment of a short supply of cash. By the be-
ginning of the 20th century such statutes had outlived their useful-
ness, partly because of a change in the source of energy, partly
because of the enormous growth of industry, and partly because their
proliferation had produced a profoundly bad effect upon the health of
the streams. The consequence has been a reorientation of legislative
thinking, although the mill acts have often been allowed to stay upon
the books. They have been rendered largely dead letters, however,
through the delegation by the legislature of the power to oversee the
damming of streams from itself to the state public service commission.
Today, persons desiring to build dams must secure a permit to do so
from the administrative agency concerned; and in so doing must be
prepared to prove the necessity and benefit of the proposed structure.
And, because the modern dam that produces electric power is a very
different structure from the predecessor that made up a head to turn
one wheel, the decision as to whether to grant the permit will involve
broad political, economic, and legal issues that make the cases under
the old mill acts seem the remnants of a halcyon age.1 13 Most river
experts today believe that even the modern agencies are too free with
their dam permits, with the result that modern rivers are so slowed
down that their repurifying powers are destroyed; but there is no
doubt that the situation would be far worse under the uncontrolled
dam construction favored by the old mill acts. Here as elsewhere
prior appropriation and the assertion of individual right have had to
be subordinated to the public interest under the management of
administrative agencies with a state-wide outlook.
THE WATERSHED AND ITS WATER USE
The orientation of the common law of water is upon the rights of
riparian land owners. A strict application of that rule would permit
stream water to be used anywhere upon the land of a title-owner of
any portion of the stream bank. This however is the rule in only a
trifling number of jurisdictions. The overwhelming number make a
further distinction which limits the definition of riparian land to that
113. For a typical statute of the modern kind, see Wis. Stat. § 31.06 (3),
31.18 (4) (1957). For the background presenting the reasons for the change
from old to new techniques of dam management, see Birge, Report on Water
Powers, in First Report of the Wisconsin Conservation Commission 10 (1909).
For an example of the modern considerations, see High Dams and Upstream
Storage, in Foreword to Proceedings, Second Annual Water Resources Con-
ference, Montana State University Studies in Law (Stone ed. 1957).
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portion lying within the watershed of the stream whose waters the
riverside owner wants to use.114
Normally, a person owning land upon the banks of a stream has
a right to make reasonable use of the water that passes by his land;
and he cannot remove that water from its stream's watershed unless
the amount removed is too slight to cause any potential damage to
the parent stream. The reason for this is plain, since a stream de-
pends upon its watershed for its volume of water. If water is ab-
stracted from one watershed and drained into another stream, a
twofold damage may result: while the first stream is deprived of its
sources, the second may be overwhelmed by an unwontedly burden-
some flow. It is true that every landowner may divert water for a
reasonable use; and, if he returns it to the original stream bed or
diverts so little that no other riparian owner is hurt, he is not re-
sponsible to anyone. But if the current is seriously reduced in one
stream, or the volume of another seriously swelled in another water-
shed, so that actual damage is suffered by those below him, then he
is responsible to them for those damages."15
Since, therefore, there is no prohibition against removing water
from its watershed so long as the use is reasonable and the water
is returned, there is a triteness in the rule that permits a riverside
owner to use water anywhere within the single tract that runs to the
stream, however many watersheds it might cross. Besides, in most
jurisdictions a riparian owner may use stream water on a separate
estate under the same limitation, by which he might remove water
from the watershed whether it lies within the watershed or not. Only
if this diversion threatens a present or future reasonable use of the
water by others will the diversion be improper-with the tacitly
understood corollary that "reasonable" will be defined only after the
persons concerned have litigated it through to a meaning.
The users that are really hit, and properly so, by the watershed rule
are those for whom the use of water means its eventual destruction.
These are industries that would use it for the manufacture of steam,
or to adulterate poisonous chemicals, and whose employment of water
means its total obliteration or its return in a condition that is in-
credibly dangerous to continued stream life unless expensive
purification techniques are applied. In the same class are municipal
114. The very slight minority view is set out in Jones v. Conn, 39 Ore. 30,
64 Pac. 855 (1901); Watkins Land Co. v. Clements, 98 Tex. 578, 86 S.W. 733
(1905). Ziegler, Water Use Under Common Law Doctrines, in Water Resources
and the Law 56-58 (1958), states the majority position, quoting Farnham, II
Water and Water Rights 1571 (1904).
115. Sturtevant v. Ford, 280 Mass. 303, 182 N.E. 560 (1932); Stratton v. Mt.
Hermon Boys' School, 216 Mass. 83, 103 N.E. 87 (1913).
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water suppliers who would deprive a stream of its flow in order to sup-
ply an urban area with its needed water. Of course, some of this may
be sent back as sewer effluent; but apart from the purity considera-
tions, many municipalities draw their water from one watershed and
dump their effluent in another, with serious if different consequences
for each. This being so, the very least the law can require is a con-
demnation of a stream's water resources for these purposes, with the
satisfaction of those whose property is expropriated by such uses.
The most that can be considered is a water management system that
looks to the total uses of a stream in the allocation of stream ser-
vices.116
This rule represents a limitation upon another "absolute" right
normally considered incident to riparian ownership. The ground
beneath the water of a non-navigable river or lake belongs to the
owners of the adjoining banks, each of whom owns the sub-water
land in equal parts with the property of each running to the middle
part or thread of the stream, subject to the right of the public to boat
and raft upon the surface of the waters. The thread is not to be
confused with the channel of the stream, which is the place in which
the water flows deepest and steadiest, for the thread lies midway
between the points on the banks at which the water rises when it is
in its natural and ordinary stage. In consequence, whatever land that
is gradually formed in the bed of the stream, whether against the
bank or not, will be divided according to the thread of the stream,
so that if an island forms itself in the precise center it will be divided
between the proprietors of the opposite banks according to the
original thread of the watercourse."17
116. For an example of state legislation on watershed regulation through
municipal conservation commissions, see Mass. Ann. Laws c. 40, § 8C (Supp.
1959); through Municipal water districts, see Mass. Ann. Laws c. 44, § 8 (3-7A)
(Supp. 1959). For state regulations of watersheds and subwatersheds through a
state water resource commission and a division of water resources in a state
department of natural resources, see Mass. Ann. Laws c. 21, §§ 8-15 (Supp.
1959). For an article on varying degrees of state regulation up to the permit
system, see Ziegler, Statutory Regulation of Water Resources, in Water Resources
and the Law 91-97 (1958).
117. State v. Burton, 106 La. 732, 31 So. 291 (1902); Harlow v. Fisk, 66
Mass. (12 Cush.) 302 (1853); Trustees of Hopkins Academy v. Dickinson, 63
Mass. (9 Cush.) 544 (1852); Ingraham v. Wilkinson, 21 Mass. (4 Pick.) 268
(1826); Adams v. Frothingham, 3 Mass. 352 (1807), concerning a statute of
1641 giving to river towns title to the river flats from low water mark or 100
rods from the upland, whichever was shorter, to the channel of the river, thus
creating an exception to the general rule; Branham v. Bledsoe Creek Turnpike
Co., 69 Tenn. 704 (1878). For a contrary definition confusing thread and
channel, see Buttenuth v. St. Louis Bridge Co., 123 Ill. 535, 17 N.E. 439 (1888);




The purpose behind this set of rules is to guarantee that in cases
where the exclusive ownership of the stream is not in a single party,
or where the owner of one bank does not own the entire bed of the
stream by agreement, the ground below the stream will be equally
divided. Whatever the shape of the shore, or however the termini
of the limits of an estate facing the stream are located, the division
has to be such that the stream, and any land to be formed by accretion
in it, should be divided in equal sections between the owners of each
bank."18
These rules are quite contrary, of course, to the increasing assertion
of a superordinate public interest in the waters of entire watersheds
in their every aspect. To own a stream bed would usually mean to
have the right to dredge it, or to extract sand and gravel from it, or
to mine islands in it, so long as lower or upper riparians were not
damaged in their riparian property interest. But now there is an
over-all public interest in the prevention of flooding, 119 in the preserva-
tion of the rate of stream flow and level, and in the protection of water
quality, which diminishes the dominion of riparian owners in the
bed. It is a development in which further, numerous changes can be
expected, pushing the public interest to the very limits permitted by
the vested property rights of the federal and state constitutions. 120
RULES ON WATER IN ARTIFICIAL COURSES
These rules, of necessity, have an effect, however indirect, upon
artificial waterways-the canals, the raceways, the ditches, the cul-
verts and pipes-that in an industrial age often carry more water than
the natural streams of an area. The three major problems in relation
118. Knight v. Wilder, 56 Mass. (2 Cush.) 199 (1848); Inhabitants of Deer-
field v. Arms, 34 Mass. (17 Pick.) 41 (1835); Mayo v. Quimby, 3 Dane Abr. 4
(1799). On the effects of the riparian doctrine, see the comments of Lowe and
Smith in Panel Discussion on Model Water Use Act, in Proceedings, Water
Law Conference, University of Texas School of Law 90, 94 (1959).
119. This is not to say there is not a law concerning flood waters. These may
be diverted freely or thrown back upon another's land. When they are thrown
back or diverted or first appear, there is no cause of action so long as the action
has not changed the watershed "on a large scale." Flood waters, if coming as
an act of nature and flowing in their wonted manner without the intervention of
man, may be diverted or obstructed, used or thrown away, as each individual
landowner pleases, so long as the water he uses to effect these purposes does not
make a major change in the nature of the watershed in which the flood waters
appear. Bainard v. City of Newton, 154 Mass. 255, 27 N.E. 995 (1891);
Macomber v. Godfrey, 108 Mass. 219 (1871). On the larger problem of controlling
the entire cycle concerned with erosion, flooding and silting, see Foss, Politics
and Grass 35-36 (1960).
120. See Pennsylvania Water & Power Resources Bd. v. Green Spring Co.,
394 Pa. 1, 145 A.2d 178 (1958).
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to these artificial courses are the rights persons upon them have in
them, the legal possibilities of such courses, and the chance of con-
verting one by operation of law from an artificial to a natural water-
way.
A landowner cannot collect a flow of surface water together into
a single stream and empty it onto his neighbor's ground, though he
can collect it together and discharge it into a natural stream that
would ordinarily receive it, even though the volume and acceleration
of the water in it is greatly increased. 121 Water can be drawn from
beneath the surface through wells and formed into an artificial chan-
nel and then poured into a natural stream without liability ;122 but if
an artificial accumulation of water escapes there is an absolute liabil-
ity for any ensuing damage unless its escape was caused by an act
of God.123 Unless a grant or prescriptive right exists, the builder of
an artificial channel for carrying off water, whether it be an accu-
mulation of surface or well water or water from some natural source
such as a pond, has no right to have it kept open when it crosses the
land of another; and when a grant does authorize it, the artificial
channel must conform strictly to the terms or else run the risk of
being closed. 12 4
Once the right to maintain an artificial stream is recognized, either
by grant or prescription, the landowner who has the right to flow it
with water secures all the rights and responsibilities of the holder of
any dominant easement, so that when he conveys the land which is
drained by the artificial channel, he conveys the latter as well even
though his deed is silent.125 When the artificial channel becomes
clogged by refuse he has the right to clean it and to put it back in
repair.12 6 When he repairs it he cannot burden the surrounding land
121. Lincoln Park Amusement Co. v. Town of Westport, 339 Mass. 334, 159
N.E.2d 598 (1959); Jackman v. Arlington Mills, 137 Mass. 277 (1884); Mitchell
Realty Co. v. City of West Allis, 184 Wis. 352, 199 N.W. 390 (1924).
122. Artz v. Hurley, 334 Mass. 606, 137 N.E.2d 916 (1956) relating to liability
for water escaping from water systems; Curtis v. Eastern R.R., 96 Mass. (14
Allen) 55 (1867).
123. Golden v. Amory, 329 Mass. 484, 109 N.E.2d 131 (1952); Fletcher v.
Rylands, L.R. 1 Ex. 265 (1866).
124. DiNardo v. Dovidio, 312 Mass. 398, 45 N.E.2d 269 (1942); Drew v.
Inhabitants of Westfield, 124 Mass. 461 (1878); Miller v. Bristol, 29 Mass. (12
Pick.) 550 (1832). "Acquiescence" in the initial installation of a drainage system
bars the future exercise of rights by the acquiescing landowner where land is
thereby flooded, Coughlin v. Bedford Gardens, Inc., 332 Mass. 755, 124 N.E.2d
917 (1955) (dicta).
125. Jasper v. Worcester Spinning & Finishing Co., 318 Mass. 752, 64 N.E.2d
89 (1945).
126. City of Bellevue v. Daly, 14 Idaho 545, 94 Pac. 1036 (1908); Babbitt v.
Safety Fund Nat. Bank, 169 Mass. 361, 47 N.E. 1018 (1897); Prescott v. White,
38 Mass. (21 Pick.) 341 (1838).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1961/iss2/1
WATER LAW
with the refuse he clears out but must carry it off and leave only the
unencumbered channel there. 127 When another blocks his artificial
channel with a permanent obstruction or destroys the channel by
pulling down its banks, the holder, of the dominant tenement may
remove the obstruction and replace the banks and recover the cost
of replacement and his injury from cessation of his rights from the
persons doing this.128 All these rights and duties are his because of
his initial right to maintain an artificial watercourse. 129
Where a ditch is dug by common consent as a neighborhood drain
and remains open as a watercourse for many years, it will be governed
by the same rules that apply to natural streams.130 By treating any
artificial channel as one made in nature's way, the law will take such
treatment as reflecting a common desire to have it formally so treated
and will act as though persons owning land on such a course were
natural riparians.' 31 Otherwise, of course, no one owning land on the
banks of a canal would have any more claim to the continued flow
of the water than if it were rain falling on his person.' 32
Not all artificial waterways need depend upon a long duration of
time in which to secure the status of natural streams. A ditch or a
pipe carrying overflow water from a natural spring is a natural water-
course, for it is not designed to carry away surface drainage but rather
a definite stream of water from a permanent source. 3 3 An artificial
pond formed from a natural stream will be treated as a natural
stream where the thread of the stream is still discernible in the water
of the pond.134 It makes no difference in the decision of the courts
127. Prescott v. White, supra note 126.
128. Moore Spinning Co. v. Boston Ice Co., 210 Mass. 364, 97 N.E. 62 (1912);
see Murphy, op. cit. supra note 79, at 115.
129. Riverdale Park Co. v. Westcott, 74 Md. 311, 22 Atl. 270 (1891).
130. Stimson v. Inhabitants of Brookline, 197 Mass. 568, 83 N.E. 893 (1908);
Freeman v. Weeks, 45 Mich. 335, 7 N.W. 904 (1881); Case v. Hoffman, 100 Wis.
314, 72 N.W. 390 (1897), judgment vacated 74 N.W. 220 (1898), affirmed in
part, reversed in part 75 N.W. 945 (1898).
131. City of Reading v. Althouse, 93 Pa. 400 (1880) ; Weatherby v. Meiklejohn,
56 Wis. 73, 13 N.W. 697 (1882); Holker v. Poritt, L.R. 8 Ex. 107 (1873);
Nuthall v. Bracewell, L.R. 2 Ex. 1 (1866); Sutcliffe v. Booth, 32 L.J.Q.B. (n.s.)
136, 139 Rev. R. 744 (1863) ; Magor v. Chadwick, 11 Ad. & E. 571, 113 Eng. Rep.
532 (K.B. 1840).
132. Holyoke Water Power Co. v. Whiting & Co., 276 Mass. 528, 177 N.E. 568
(1931).
133. See 9 R.C.L. Drains and Sewers § 2 (1915) dealing with drains which
do not carry water from natural sources.
134. De Witt v. Bissell, 77 Conn. 530, 60 Atl. 113 (1905); Phinney v. Watts,
75 Mass. (9 Gray) 269 (1857); Village of Pewaukee v. Savoy, 103 Wis. 271, 79
N.W. 436 (1899).
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whether a stream has been a tidal stream or not.15 If artificial
in origin and not justified as the outlet of a spring or the result of an
obstructed natural stream, it will be treated as a natural stream if
permitted to exist for over twenty years.136 Beyond these rules the
courts have made few inquiries, apparently satisfying themselves
with the idea that they have adequately solved the problems raised
by the existence of artificial watercourses. Naturally, they are sub-
ject to the general rules so far referred to; and, in addition, the law
relating to them is likewise affected by the nature of modern indus-
trial demands. Since nothing less than total control is sufficient, much
of the old law relating to a sharing of a surplus quantity among
several owners is now irrelevant. In the presence of contemporary
ownership techniques relating to the water resource, the problems of
the past simply do not exist.
GROUND WATER
Up to this point all the discussion in this paper has centered upon
the problem of water appearing upon the top of the ground, either as
streams, artificial courses, or vagrant surface water. There is, how-
ever, an equally important aspect to water both in a physical and a
legal sense: that water exists below the level of the earth. Here
the law reflects the technical knowledge of the distant past which
divided water below ground into springs, underground rivers, and
percolating water. It is a system that knows nothing of aquifers, of
connate waters, of below-surface pressures, or of the accumulating
knowledge of hydrology gained over the past century. Fortunately,
the legal system is not impervious to an absorption of this new
knowledge, but it must be done in classical terms, so that water
bursting from an aquifer under natural pressure is a "flowing well"
or "spring"; water seeping from saturated ground is also a "spring";
and all other underground water, apart from the extremely rare
stygian streams, is denominated "percolating."1 37
The consequence has been that the rules concerning ground water
actually constitute something of a game of toss in the law. A private
landowner is as much the owner of all percolating waters flowing
135. Dodge v. Inhabitants of Rockport, 199 Mass. 274, 85 N.E. 172 (1908).
136. MeGowen v. Carr, 272 Mass. 573, 172 N.E. 787 (1920).
137. For the ancient knowledge, see Vitruvius, The Ten Books of Architecture,
Bk. VIII (Morgan transl. 1914). Vitruvius probably wrote about the time of
the Principate of Octavius Augustus and was rediscovered by Renaissance
writers. For medieval notions, see Murphy, op. cit. supra note 79, at 107-09. For
a modern view explaining the reconciliation between legal terms and modern
knowledge, see Piper & Thomas, Hydrology and Water Law: What Is Their
Future Common Ground?, in Water Resources and the Law at 9 (1958).
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under his lands as he is of the earth or stones or minerals therein.138
In drawing them up he may be indifferent to what other landowner's
water supply he thereby cuts off; he may pipe the water off and sell
it to consumers; and, if he wastes it so that his land and the land
of others about the water supply arp lowered in value, it is no respon-
sibility of his in the law.139 He is, in short, absolute master of its
disposal; and no other private landowner, however adversely affected,
may say him nay.140 The same absolute rights pertain to a river that
sinks below the surface of the ground. It ceases to be a watercourse
and no one, except the one in whose land it has disappeared, retains
any interest in this water until it passes from beneath his title to
another's who will have then the same absolute dominion over it.'11
There have been exceptions, however, to this rule. If the user is
a municipality, or a private person acting under a public power of
eminent domain, under orders to compensate for water taken, then
percolating waters, even when drawn upon their own lands, must be
paid for to all who can prove deprivation. In the case of springs the
rule is somewhat different, for there either a private user or a
purveyor of water for public use may call upon the spring's entire
resources without hindrance, whatever the effect upon those who may
previously have relied upon those waters in which the spring has its
origin. It is in the definition of "spring" that the limitation comes,
since in the case of a public user, who has been ordered by authority
to secure a public water supply and compensate for it, the courts will
strictly delimit the scope of the meaning of "spring." Of course,
under the absolute dominion rule, even the user of the spring is
not secure, since adjoining landowners may cut off the flow of water
to the spring and thus dry it up. It is a dog-eat-dog kind of law that
would have delighted the heart of Herbert Spencer.'142
138. Wilson v. City of New Bedford, 108 Mass. 261 (1871).
139. Davis v. Spaulding, 157 Mass. 431, 32 N.E. 650 (1892).
140. For an interesting viewpoint, see Walker, Theories of Ownership and
Control of Oil and Gas Compared With Those of Ground Water, in Proceedings,
Water Law Conference, University of Texas School of Law, 121-33 (1956).
141. Macomber v. Godfrey, 108 Mass. 219 (1871). Streams retaining their
identity below ground, clearly ascertainable to be such, especially when later
emerging as rivers on the surface, will, however, be treated in the same manner
as surface natural water courses. The problem is one of proof. See Martz,
Cases on Natural Resources 376 (1951); cf. Branson, Instructions to Juries
§ 1470 (2d ed. 1925).
142. On limits imposed by adjoining landowners on a spring user, Greenleaf v.
Francis, 35 Mass. (18 Pick.) 117 (1836); on the power of the spring user,
Proprietors of Mills on Monatiquot River v. Braintree Water Supply Co., 149
Mass. 478, 21 N.E. 761 (1889); Chase v. Cram, 39 R.I. 83, 97 Aft. 481 (1916);
on limiting the meaning of "spring," Town of Holliston v. Holliston Water Co.,
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On the other hand, although one owes no responsibility to others
for diminishing the amount of percolating waters in the ground, one
is liable for increasing the quantity to the damage of other proprietors.
To store an accumulation of water on one's own ground that later
percolates away, or to cut away nature's barriers so that sea water
percolates generally through seaside lands, or to cause an artificial
pressure to force water to percolate more rapidly through the soil,
is to be liable if any damage from flooding or waterlogging ensues.
Common tort rules apply in such cases and the courts have found
little difficulty in holding the perpetrators responsible. Perhaps it is
because the damage has been so much more plainly apparent in a
waterlogged field than in one gradually being drained of the moisture
in it.243
These rules on below-surface waters have been profoundly influ-
enced by the rules developed to deal with vagrant surface waters as a
brief consideration for comparative purposes will show. Where nature
drains one piece of land onto another, the owner of the lower piece
may change its grade by filling it in and then throwing the water
back, even if the other land be a public highway.144 And it does not
end there. The other owner may then do the same to his land and
return the water. 45 There are, however, certain limits upon the play-
ers under the rules of the game. One landowner cannot accumulate
surface water on his land and discharge it upon his neighbor through
an artificial channel,' 46 nor may he drain it into a natural watercourse
or cesspool that cannot contain it.147 A landowner cannot use an elab-
306 Mass. 17, 27 N.E.2d 194 (1940); on compensation obligations, Hittinger
Fruit Co. v. City of Cambridge, 218 Mass. 220, 105 N.E. 868 (1914); Gloucester
Water Supply Co. v. City of Gloucester, 179 Mass. 365, 60 N.E. 977 (1901);
Hollingsworth & Vose Co. v. Foxborough Water Supply Dist., 165 Mass. 186, 42
N.E. 574 (1896). See also, Huber v. Merkel, 117 Wis. 355, 94 N.W. 354 (1903);
27 R.C.L. Waters § 91 (1920).
143. Mears v. Dole, 135 Mass. 508 (1883); Harper, Torts § 156 (1933). But
see, Moore v. Berlin Mills Co., 74 N.H. 305, 67 Atl. 578 (1907).
144. Gannon v. Hargadon, 92 Mass. (10 Allen) 106 (1865) (on throwing off
vagrant surface water); Harrison v. Poli-New England Theatres, Inc., 304 Mass.
123, 23 N.E.2d 99 (1939) (even though the recipient is a public highway).
145. Deyo v. Athol Housing Authority, 335 Mass. 459, 140 N.E.2d 393 (1957);
Fulton v. Town of Belmont, 333 Mass. 64, 127 N.E.2d 569 (1955) (on throwing
the vagrant water back, especially if it is a public highway rejecting surface
water in order to keep roads safe for travel); Smith v. Faxon, 156 Mass. 589, 31
N.E. 687 (1892) (dictum).
146. Maddock v. City of Springfield, 281 Mass. 103, 183 N.E. 148 (1932)
(dictum); Belcastro v. Norris, 261 Mass. 174, 158 N.E. 535 (1927) (on con-
centrating a stream).
147. Stanchfield v. City of Newton, 142 Mass. 110, 7 N.E. 703 (1886) (on
overloading natural or artificial drainage areas).
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orate system of drains to keep his land dry when the discharge upon
his neighbor is in a concentrated stream of water,14 8 nor may he use
his land as a dumping ground for ice and snow collected elsewhere. 1 49
The rights of the discharger, nevertheless, are rather extensive. He
may erect any manner of buildings whatever their effect on the drain-
age of surrounding land.150 He may farm his land even though the soil
is carried off by erosion onto his neighbor's, so long as he works it in
a customary manner.15' He may fill in his land even if it be a swamp
and the water raised by his action floods his neighbos, for he is the
master of his own land. 152 He is never liable for any damages caused
by the natural flow of surface water off his land ;", and where it comes
upon his land through an artificial channel, he may bar it by a wall or
grading or carry it off by ditches.14
In short, like the water below the surface, the whole problem
has been given a solution that amounts to organized anarchy.
In heavily settled communities, with mobile populations, this must
lead to a whole series of impossible situations that could be solved
better under a more rational system. In part this is done now through
local zoning, platting regulations, development codes, building sys-
tems, and planning authorities, through state administrative control
over high-capacity wells, domestic wells and sewage systems, and
other fragmentary limitations. But these do not handle the entire
problem and because of the atomized nature of the units concerned
probably will not do so in anything like the near future. Here the
ancient rules are likely to remain in force for some time yet.
REMEDIES
Once the substantive rules have been laid out, the problem that
then arises is the means of their enforcement. The law provides three
methods: by prescriptive right, through condemnation under eminent
domain, and through suits at law and in equity for the repelling of
attacks upon a property interest in water. Beyond these private forms
of relief, of course, exist the remedies of the state for protection of
the public interest. All comprise the total of the means of imple-
148. Manning v. Woodlawn Cemetery Corp., 249 Mass. 281, 144 N.E. 99
(1924) (on prohibition of an elaborate system that overburdens adjoining land).
149. McDonnell v. Cambridge R.R., 151 Mass. 159, 23 N.E. 841 (1890) (on
prohibition of using land as a dump for snow and ice).
150. Bates v. Smith, 100 Mass. 181 (1868).
151. Middlesex Co. v. McCue, 149 Mass. 103, 21 N.E. 230 (1889).
152. Dickinson v. City of Worcester, 89 Mass. (7 Allen) 19 (1863) (dictum).
153. Morrill v. Hurley, 120 Mass. 99 (1876).
154. White v. Chapin, 94 Mass. (12 Allen) 516 (1866); Morse v. Copeland,
68 Mass. (2 Gray) 302 (1854).
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mentation of the basic policies of the law; and, since the policies are
not consistent, there is a certain deficiency in their administration.
That the deficiency is not greater is due to the requirements of the
economy that periodically assert the realities over the legalities of the
physical situation.
Because of the transient nature of water it is difficult to acquire
prescriptive rights in it. It is not enough to erect structures on one's
own land and use the water to even its full capacity as it flows past:
one must instead erect a dam and thus reduce the water to a more
complete kind of possession in order to assure one's use of it. It must
be a use inconsistent with, and therefore adverse to, the rights of
others who may have an interest in the stream, such as by a diversion
or a raising of the water to an unreasonable height. The measurement
of the right to water in a stream is by the height of the dam and not
the quantity of flowage; and the amount of water to which a pre-
scriptive right can be taken will depend upon what proportion it
bears to the total volume.15 The main purport of all the rules relating
to prescription is that the taking be open, notorious, and as complete
as possible; that the taking not be authorized by an agreement, and
that the taking be hostile to the interests of the true owner.10 They
are the standard requirements, varied only by the problem of possess-
ing water.
Every overflowing of land, not done under the mill acts, is a
prescriptive taking of that land if done for over twenty years, since
it is open, notorious, and plainly adverse to the interest of the title
owner.157 The title holder must constantly guard himself against
155. New England Mica Co. v. Waltham Factories, Inc., 301 Mass. 56, 16
N.E.2d 87 (1938) ; Tinker v. Bessel, 213 Mass. 74, 99 N.E. 946 (1912) ; Pratt v.
Lamson, 84 Mass. (2 Allen) 275 (1861); Gould v. Boston Duck Co., 79 Mass.
(13 Gray) 442 (1859) (dictum); Cary v. Daniels, 49 Mass. (8 Met.) 466 (1844).
Along with the right to the water goes the right of access. Churchill v. Harris,
257 Mass. 499, 154 N.E. 87 (1926). It is, of course, a "right" in water use
rather than in the water itself in which a prescriptive right arises. 27 R.C.L.
Waters § 195 (1921). Prescription may always arise in the land over which
the water flows. II Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, 648 & n. 1
(4th ed. Cooley 1899).
156. Boliver Mfg. Co. v. Neponset Mfg. Co., 33 Mass. (16 Pick.) 241 (1834);
Strickler v. Todd, 25 Pa. (10 S. & R.) 63 (1823); Charnley v. Shawano Water
Power & River Improvement Co., 109 Wis. 563, 85 N.W. 507 (1901) ; see Lund v.
City of New Bedford, 121 Mass. 286 (1876) (dictum).
157. Barker v. Kennard, 226 Mass. 586, 116 N.E. 391 (1917); Williams v.
Nelson, 40 Mass. (23 Pick.) 141 (1839). However, there is no prescriptive taking
of a pond where only a few fishermen are excluded, Hittinger v. Eames, 121
Mass. 539 (1877). A mere occasional use is not enough. Carville v. Common-
wealth, 192 Mass. 570, 78 N.E. 735 (1906). Where prescriptive rights by
statute run against the state, the state in turn may re-assert its title by prescrip-
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prescription, just as the holder of prescriptive rights must guard
against a counter-prescription. Even where an agreement exists
between parties a prescription may still arise, although it is harder
to establish acts clearly derogatory to the other's interests. 158 Once
obtained, a prescription becomes an absolute dominion, so that it
need not be used for anyone's advantage and may lie unused, although,
if there is any intention of abandonment in such disuse, a prescriptive
easement will be lost."59 It is, in short, a complete protection to assert
a prescriptive power to act; but, given the importance of economic
interest likely to be left unasserted for a period of twenty years in
the face of active challenge, prescription has not been, and is not likely
to be, of the same significance as other legal remedies.
Of greater importance is the operation of the power of eminent
domain. Whether the title to property is taken by the state or by a
private party acting under state authority, compensation rules are the
same. The private owner whose property is taken cannot refuse to
go along with the taking, and he must be satisfied with the money he
receives for his property. His otherwise inalienable rights are in this
instance subject to a higher purpose, or at least to a purpose so
considered by the law.
A riverside owner, though entitled to the flow of a stream, may be
deprived of it by the power of eminent domain, and he is entitled to
receive as compensation the loss in market value at a normal sale that
his land has suffered due to the loss of the water rights attached to it.
It is not the value of the land to the buyer or the seller that is im-
portant, though the business profits the seller has made from its use
may be shown to prove its value. It is the general market value which
the land has that is considered. 60 Once the compensation has been
fixed, either in a lump sum or in the annual payments alternatively
allowed under the mill acts, it will be judged to include everything,
tion through taking by an uninterrupted public use. Attorney General v. Ellis,
198 Mass. 91, 84 N.E. 430 (1908). Normally, though, no public use can create a
prescriptive easement by jus spatiandi. In re Ellenborough, [1956] Ch. 131;
Attorney General v. Antrobus, [1905] 2 Ch. 188.
158. MacLeod v. Davis, 290 Mass. 335, 195 N.E. 315 (1935).
159. Chandler v. Jamaica Pond Aqueduct Co., 125 Mass. 544 (1878); Brace
v. Yale, 99 Mass. 488 (1868) (on disuse and abandonment). For an extreme
example of prescriptive right in apparent conflict with the doctrine of voluntary
benefits, see Whittenton Mfg. Co. v. Staples, 164 Mass. 319, 41 N.E. 441 (1895).
160. See Amory v. Commonwealth, 321 Mass. 240, 72 N.E.2d 549 (1947) (on
value); Moulton v. Newburyport Water Co., 137 Mass. 163 (1884) (on value).
Sometimes when property taken has little value except to the taker, the court
will consider this peculiar value in setting damages, see Cobb v. Massachusetts
Chemical Co., 179 Mass. 423, 60 N.E. 790 (1901).
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serving as a bar to further recovery if definite in its terms.10' Even
though only a part of the land is taken, compensation must be paid
for all of it if the part not taken suffers a loss in value from the
taking, and a taker of property under eminent domain is limited to
that which is necessary for its public purpose.1 2 The net of what is
compensable is cast very wide indeed. Although a landowner can
ordinarily do with percolating water what he pleases, a water supplier
with powers of eminent domain must compensate for the taking;
although if no harm has been suffered by any taking, that is if other
users would get the same amount of water despite conjoint public use
of stream or percolating waters, no, or only nominal, compensation
would be allowed . 3 Private property cannot be taken for a private
use, naturally; but what constitutes a public use is so broadly con-
ceived that whatever benefits a section of the community is a public
use irrespective of who gets the profits or how much the profits are.
If the legislature has seen fit to imbue a purpose with a public char-
acter and give it the right to condemn private property for its
effectuation, the courts in the field of water law have not been prone
to interfere.164
161. On the limitations implied as a consequence of the award, see Pajak v.
Chicopee Mfg. Corp., 246 Mass. 439, 141 N.E. 112 (1923); Boston & Maine R.R.
v. Hunt, 210 Mass. 128, 96 N.E. 140 (1911); Hatch v. Dwight, 17 Mass. 289
(1821).
162. See Jenks v. Mayor & Mun. Council of Taunton, 227 Mass. 293, 116 N.E.
550 (1917) (on requirement that a statute be precise); Stevens v. City of
Worcester, 219 Mass. 128, 106 N.E. 587 (1914) (on requirement of taking to
conform strictly thereto); Rourke v. Central Mass. Elee. Co., 177 Mass. 46,
58 N.E. 470 (1900) (on liability for partial taking); Framingham Water Co. v.
Old Colony R.R., 176 Mass. 404, 57 N.E. 680 (1900) (on liability for partial
taking). For an excellent general discussion, see Covey, Access Control (1960)
(comparing police power and eminent domain); Heaney, Valuation of Property
(1960).
163. Bailey v. Inhabitants of Woburn, 126 Mass. 416 (1879); Dwight Printing
Co. v. City of Boston, 122 Mass. 583 (1877). On compensable rights in great
ponds, see Gardner Water Co. v. Inhabitants of Gardner, 185 Mass. 190, 69 N.E.
1051 (1904); Watuppa Reservoir Co. v. Cit of Fall River, 147 Mass. 548, 18
N.E. 465 (1888). Under the mill acts, an arbitrator may give an annual award
for annual damages actually suffered, with the fee owner entitled to the use of
the land whenever it is free of water. Smith v. Langewald, 140 Mass. 205, 4 N.E.
571 (1885); Fitch v. Taft, 126 Mass. 503 (1879); Bates v. Ray, 102 Mass. 458
(1869). These cases underscore the primitive industrial conditions underlying
these acts. When such a pond is itself taken by eminent domain, evidence will not
be heard of replacement costs for a new power source, but only proof of the pond's
present value, Phillips v. County of Middlesex, 127 Mass. 262 (1879), although
when a mill pond is made by diversion, the owner of riparian land upon the
diverted stream may show its capabilities and uses as they were with the stream's




Where the land flowed benefits from the flowing, the amount of the
benefit is deductible from the amount of the damage, while conversely,
if the land deteriorates from the flowing, compensation for damage to
the fee must be added under the old mill acts. Under them the amount
of the damage depends upon the constancy or frequency of the flowing
and the utility of the land when free of water.165 These rules, like
those mentioned in other instances, are related to the general rules
of eminent domain; but there exists a special willingness on the part
of the courts in water law cases to find a public interest which has
been lacking in the past in other areas of the law. This has always
been the great hurdle. Once that is successfully negotiated, it is
axiomatic that great and small alike are subjectible to the power of
eminent domain which takes precedence over all other property rights,
since it is the right of the whole people, expressed by their governing
authority, to use the resources of the state for what is deemed the
benefit of the community.
Somewhat related to this class of cases are those which come before
the courts upon an argument of the parties for a division of water.
It cannot be said that the courts have shown much imagination in
solving the problems brought before them in this way. Where mill
sites were sold upon a canal, with a promise of a specific power supply
to each, the court compelled the provision of the power supply prom-
ised, even though the amount of water available was less than existed
when the agreement was made. The court said that another pond
could be provided and water secured from other sources than the one
first planned for; and the court could not see where it differed from
any ordinary suit upon a contract.166 Nor did the court face the
problem any more clearly in a case where a railroad ran its track
across the reservoirs of a tidal mill supplying power to several plants.
Here it ducked out on the grounds that the tidal mill had lost only two
of its twenty power sites, and so refused to arbitrate the rights of two
utilities, both specifically authorized by the legislature.67 As for
164. Boston & Roxbury Mill Corp. v. Newman, 29 Mass. (12 Pick.) 467
(1832) ; Watson v. Inhabitants of Needham, 161 Mass. 404, 37 N.E. 204 (1894) ;
Mumpower v. City of Bristol, 90 Va. 151, 17 S.E. 853 (1893) (minority view on
condemnation for mill purposes through prior appropriation without statutory
authorization).
165. Standish v. Washburn, 38 Mass. (21 Pick.) 237 (1838); Palmer Co. v.
Ferrill, 34 Mass. (17 Pick.) 58 (1835); Wolcott Woolen Mfg. Co. v. Upham, 22
Mass. (5 Pick.) 292 (1827). No mill privilege resulting from eminent domain is
immune from a superior assertion of eminent domain. Kelliher v. Miller, 97
Mass. 71 (1867); cf. Chapman v. Newmarket Mfg. Co., 74 N.H. 424, 68 Atl.
868 (1908).
166. Wamesit Power Co. v. Sterling Mills, 158 Mass. 435, 33 N.E. 503 (1893).
167. Boston Water Power Co. v. Boston & Worcester R.R., 33 Mass. (16
Pick.) 512 (1835).
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common owners of a stream, the court has divided their interests on
the analogy of two lords' rights to a single villein, which is ingenious
if not sufficient to the needs expressed.1 8 Other attempts have been
tried, such as the appointment of commissioners to hear the facts and
make recommendations, or the use of a master for the same purpose;
but generally in these cases the court has simply fallen back on some
reasonable division of the quantity of water available, which has
usually meant an arbitrary partition based on the court's under-
standing of the facts. Perhaps, given the state of the problem and
putting aside the fancifulness of some of the water law, this has
been the best that could be done.10 9
There is an even more complex background to the remedies of the
landholder unjustly invaded by another. At early common law a
variety of remedies gradually grew up. Originally, the sole one was
probably a writ of right in the court of the chief lord of the manor,
to which was added the assize of nuisance and the assize of freehold,
as well as the right of novel disseisin and specialized writs from the
chancery office. 70 Gradually, as the court systems developed, certain
remedies languished and others came to the fore. The steady
deterioration of the manorial courts meant doom for the writ of
right, while the other primitive remedies were eventually ousted by
the developing suits in trespass, trespass on the case, and tortious
nuisance, because the latter permitted an adjudication through the
newer institution of jury trial. The independent growth of the equity
powers in the chancellor also provided the remedy by prohibitory
injunction and recovery of the thing lost through the action of specific
performance. By the time of the American Revolution, each of these
latter remedies had secured a firm hold in the colonial law, capable of
survival into the present. 171
Today, any flooding of another's land not authorized by statute is a
trespass for which the injured landowner may sue in damages and
may enjoin if it is a trespass continuous in nature. The recovery for
wrongful damages through a general recovery in tort is also available.
The general tort remedy seems to be popular even where there has
168. Bliss v. Rice, 34 Mass. (16 Pick.) 23 (1835).
169. Proprietors of Mills on Charles River v. Proprietors of Mills on Mill
Creek and Neponsit River, 24 Mass. (7 Pick.) 207 (1828).
170. Murphy, English Water Law Doctrines Before 1400, 1 Am. J. Legal
Hist. 103, 106-18 (1957). By the 19th century the writ of right was triable
before the grand assize at nisi prius and not before a jury even if both parties
agreed. 2 Tidd, Practice 805 (2d Amer. ed. 1828).
171. The survival of archaisms may have been too complete. Compare Mayo v.
Quimby, 3 Dane Abr. 4 (1799), with Miller v. Darby, 336 Mass. 243, 143 N.E.2d




been the equivalent of an initial wrongful entry instead of a mere
deprivation, so that the courts satisfy themselves with the use of the
phrase "recovery in tort" rather than attempting to insist upon
recovery under a pure trepass doctrine. Thus, if a factory is flooded
by a dam that is too high, 172 or if the full force of a stream's current
is injuriously thrown against the other bank because of silt eroding
from an earth dump, 173 or if the surface water is collected so near
the boundary that it flows upon neighbors' land, the remedy lies in
tort.'17 Presumably, if the strict pleading of common law were still
in vogue, these would be considered illustrations of trespass on the
case; but the decline of the rigid pleading rules renders the general
description of cases sounding in tort a satisfactory one. Sometimes
modern cases rebut the presumption that contemporary pleading is
simple. For instance, it has been said that a suit brought upon the
theory of wrongful trespass is not demurrable for statutory justifica-
tion, for the reason that demurrers, going only to errors on the face of
the pleadings, make it necessary to set up claims of statutory author-
ity by way of plea or answer." 5 Even so, however, the pleading prob-
lems today in water law are simpler by far than those with which our
legal ancestors wrestled.
The damages that are secured in tort suits cover losses of a perma-
nent nature that have reduced the market value of the land, or cover
injuries of a temporary nature which, though reparable, have dimin-
ished this market value. Where something like an ice crop is lost, the
owner of the crop recovers its market value, after proof that, but for
the wrongful acts, he had every likelihood of successfully retrieving
the entire crop or some part of it.176 To what extent similar interests
that are incorporeal hereditaments, whether called profits d prendre,
commons sans nombre, easements, liberties, or what-have-you in legal
parlance, are similarly protected from wrongful harms under water
law doctrines is difficult to say; but, logically, where their origin,
operation and effect are the same, there is no reason for the result
to be different. 77
172. Bemis v. Clark, 28 Mass. (11 Pick.) 452 (1831).
173. Nass v. Town of Duxbury, 327 Mass. 396, 99 N.E.2d 54 (1951).
174. Siciliano v. Barbuto, 265 Mass. 390, 164 N.E. 467 (1928). See also Dean
v. Colt, 99 Mass. 480 (1868); Thompson v. Moore, 84 Mass. (2 Allen) 350 (1861).
175. Davenport v. Town of Danvers, 332 Mass. 580, 126 N.E.2d 530 (1955).
176. Belkus v. City of Brockton, 282 Mass. 285, 184 N.E. 812 (1933); Hand-
forth v. Maynard, 154 Mass. 414, 28 N.E. 348 (1891); Branson, op. cit. supra
note 141, § 1474 (1). Compare A. Da Prato Co. v. City of Boston, 334 Mass. 186,
134 N.E.2d 438 (1956), with Bond Pharmacy, Inc. v. City of Cambridge, 338
Mass. 488, 156 N.E.2d 34 (1959) ; Ewing v. City of Louisville, 140 Ky. 726, 131
S.W. 1016 (1910); Hargreaves v. Kimberly, 26 W.Va. 787 (1885).
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How successful the choice of remedies available proves, or how
adequate the recovery permitted, are both the result of a long slow
process in legal-historical development. The modern claimant has
been freed of many limitations put upon him by requirements of
previous ages; and the legislatures and courts have attempted, though
often hampered by a great fund of ancient learning, to keep the
parallel lines of law and need reasonably close to each other. Doubt-
less the administrative system that is urged as a replacement for the
judicial process by some might be a great improvement upon the lat-
ter, which only careful examination upon what have been dogmatic
statements can prove.178 Still, harried as we may be by the current
and prospective water problems our material pace of change forces
upon us, and anxious as we may be to find rational solutions, a strong
suspicion cannot help but arise that the determining authority of the
future will not escape completely the course of the past eight hundred
years in this legal area. Reform, however ruthless, is rarely that
complete.
SUMMARY
This, then, comprises the law relating to water in that part of the
United States with the heaviest population and industrial concentra-
tion--or that part of it which has a traditional origin modified by
decisions and some legislation. Apart from it there exists an ever-
increasing body of law, partly statutory and partly administrative,
that has not been covered in this paper. The importance of this latter
body of law can be expected to increase greatly, particularly if the
water increase needed by the American economy should be provided
by government expenditures. In such a case, the water would be a
gratuity allowed by the federal government, with the power in the
government to set the conditions for its allocation free from the
constitutional limitations that apply to some of the water presently
provided by nature. And as to those constitutional limitations, which
in the case of water law have always been less stringent than in many
other instances, the altering public attitudes as to public interest
concepts can be expected to put an ever closer check on the right of
the individual to use a vital resource merely for his personal ag-
grandizement.
177. Davenport v. Town of Danvers, 336 Mass. 106, 142 N.E.2d 753 (1957);
Talbot v. Whipple, 73 Mass. (7 Gray) 122 (1856). This clearly applies in an
action for emblements. Chicago, R.T. & P. Ry. v. Johnson, 25 Okla. 760, 107 Pac.
662 (1910).
178. Hutchins, General Survey of Types of Procedures in the Western States,
in Proceedings, Water Law Conference, University of Texas School of Law 56
(1956). See Murphy, Water Purity Ch. 6 (1961) (comparison of judicial and
administrative methods and their differing functions).
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This is not to say that the role of the private individual's needs in
the law are to be entirely swallowed up in the rising social necessity.
It does mean, however, that the same rules that applied to a com-
munity with abundant resources, a short supply of capital, and a small
population cannot be expected to always have equal validity when
these conditions radically change. When the physical circumstances
upon which a society builds its economic structure are altered by the
operation of that economy, the law which orders that society must
necessarily reflect the differences. Our legal system relating to water,
and to other flow resources which make up our life cycle, is in process
of making that reflective change. In part this paper reveals that; in
part it shows the resistance to it; and in part it indicates those sectors
in which change at law is irrelevant. Anything beyond this is the
work of volumes.
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